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IS A SUBSTANTIVE, NON-POSITIVIST 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW POSSIBLE? 
Dan Tarlock* 
U.S. environmental law is almost exclusively positive and procedural. The 
foundation is the pollution control and biodiversity conservation statutes enacted 
primarily between 1969–1980 and judicial decisions interpreting them. This law 
has created detailed processes for making decisions but has produced few substan-
tive constraints on private and public decisions which impair the environment. 
Several substantive candidates have been proposed, such as the common law, a 
constitutional right to a healthy environment, the public trust, and the extension 
of rights to fauna and flora. However, these candidates have not produced the 
hoped for substantive law. Many argue that a substantive U.S. environmental 
law is not possible because the law can only serve to establish rational processes 
for resolving deep and bitter resource use conflicts. This Article argues that 
international environmental law can serve as a source of mixed procedural-
substantive principles because it has taken a much more holistic view of the 
environment, developed a set of overarching norms—soft as they are—that apply 
to almost all environmental problems, and has done a better job of linking proce-
dure with substance in order to constrain decisions that adversely impact human 
and ecosystem “health.” The Article offers three proposed principles to strengthen 
the unfulfilled project of environmental protection. First, procedural duties must 
be linked to the implementation of substantive outcomes. Second, incomplete in-
formation must be a basis for regulatory actions, provided that a minimal 
scientific threshold of risk is established, processes are in place to acquire addi-
tional information, and the decision maker can adjust to changed circumstances. 
Third,  decisions should exhibit planetary stewardship by applying the best avail-
able technology, utilizing the polluter pays principle, promoting an accepted 
standard of sustainable development, adopting the least intrusive resource use 
option with adaptive feedback, and restoring degraded ecosystems.  
                                                                                                                      
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 
1965 Stanford University. National Associate, The National Academies and Honorary 
Professor, UNESCO Centre for Water Law, Policy, and Science, University of Dundee, 
Scotland. Earlier versions of this Article were given at a student seminar at the University of 
California, Berkeley, organized by Professor Dan Farber, and a faculty workshop at the 
University of Iowa. I am grateful for the many helpful criticisms and comments received at 
both places. This Article is a reflection of themes that I toyed with for several decades and is 
the product of the outpouring of excellent environmental law scholarship that began in the 
late 1960s. I apologize in advance for not citing it all. I would like to thank the editors of this 
journal, especially Mr. Jack Dafoe, J.D. 2012, for their hard work to make this sprawling 
essay more coherent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Have four plus decades of environmental regulation produced a “real” 
U.S. environmental law?1 I define “real” law as a body of law with an ab-
stract set of core background, substantive principles that either constrain 
                                                                                                                      
 1. This Article extends an earlier effort to grapple with the question of whether a 
“real” environmental law exists. A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental 
Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213 (2003). 
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inconsistent state behavior or mandate a relatively stable set of socially 
desired outcomes by the private sector. The current answer is no. There is 
no substantive, non-positivist U.S. environmental law. The reasons lie in 
the history of the development of environmental law. Environmental law is 
a product of federal legislation passed between 1969 and 1980. This legisla-
tion and resulting judicial opinions created new procedures and standards 
for decisions about the use of our air, land and water endowments, ensuring 
that more weight is given to environmental considerations. However, this 
legacy has also created formidable, perhaps insurmountable, barriers to the 
creation of a non-positivist environmental law. The lack of a substantive, 
non-positivist environmental law is important because the scientific conclu-
sions about adverse consequences of the ways in which we exploit and use 
the Earth’s resources2 and waste assimilative capacity3 require that the legal 
system must make it more difficult (but not impossible) to marginalize ef-
forts to change the status quo by addressing these problems. A “real” 
environmental law must limit public and private power to trade off envi-
ronmental protection for other objectives.  
The problem is that environmental protection goes against the whole 
religious and secular Western tradition from the Greeks forward.4 And, 
because it is the product of majoritarian consensus,5 environmental law is 
neither primarily concerned with the protection of constitutional liberties 
                                                                                                                      
 2. See Note, Uncommon Goods on Environmental Virtues and Voluntary Carbon Offsets, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 2065 (2010) (arguing that environmentalism encompasses the virtue of 
avoiding wastefulness). 
 3. For example, the assimilative capacity of a body of water is its ability “to cleanse 
itself; its capacity to receive waste waters or toxic materials without deleterious effects and 
without damage to aquatic life or humans who consume the water.” JASPER WOMACH, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 97905, AGRICULTURE: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS, PROGRAMS, 
AND LAWS 22 (2005), available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/05jun/97-905.pdf. 
 4. Law takes its cues from underlying societal values; thus, law has served as an 
instrument of the human domination of nature. There is a lively intellectual debate about 
whom to blame—the Hebrews, the Greeks or the Christians. See J. DONALD HUGHES, 
PAN’S TRAVAIL: ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF ANCIENT GREEKS AND ROMANS (1994) 
(arguing that the decline of ancient civilizations is partially due to environmental exploita-
tion); JOHN PASSMORE, MAN’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE (1974) (coming down on the 
side of primarily blaming the Greeks and the Christians).  
 5. Almost ten years ago, Professor Richard Lazarus noted that the “republican 
moment” that produced the statutory foundation of environmental law had disappeared 
sometime in the 1980s. Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in 
Environmental Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999 (2003). Things have only gotten worse since the 
article was published, as illustrated by the failure of Congress and the Executive to pass 
legislation to respond to global climate change. The idea of environmental protection is 
currently under direct attack by the Republican Party, which wants to roll back “excessive” 
protection levels and curtail the authority and budget of the Democrat-infested Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). 
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from legislative abuse6 nor is it an integral component of the Western 
project of human dignity.7 As such, it lacks a compelling constitutional 
narrative rooted in Western values.8 Various substantive principles for 
environmental law have been offered by academics, but none are entirely 
workable, nor have they gained much traction. 
This Article suggests that the emerging field of international environ-
mental law, soft and weak as it is, may provide foundational domestic 
principles because it has had to take a more holistic view of the scale and 
complexity of environmental threats, has responded more directly to the 
imperatives of science, and has linked procedure and substance in ways that 
better advance the project of environmental protection than current, posi-
tive U.S. environmental law.9  
                                                                                                                      
 6. Few students of environmental law would agree with Justice Scalia’s amazing 
characterization of the purpose of the Endangered Species Act’s (ESA) requirement that 
Biological Opinions be prepared for actions that may jeopardize the existence of a species: 
“While this no doubt serves to advance the ESA’s overall goal of species preservation, we 
think it readily apparent that another objective (if not the primary one) is to avoid needless 
economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing 
their environmental objectives.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176–77 (1997) (emphasis 
added); cf. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2006). That said, of 
course environmental regulation is not immune from constitutional constraints such as 
takings, due process, and the need for constitutional bases for federal regulation. 
 7. Pollution control law does have roots in the human dignity tradition because it has 
been expressly linked to the protection of property and human rights. E.g., Ostra v. Spain, 
303 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) 38 (1994). There is an ongoing effort to recognize environmental 
protection entitlements as human rights. E.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 429–39 (2d ed. 2007); BURNS H. 
WESTON & TRACY BACH, RECALIBRATING THE LAW OF HUMANS WITH THE LAW OF 
NATURE: CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE  
(2009), available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/CLI%20Policy%20Paper/CLI_ 
Policy_Paper.pdf; Symposium, International Human Rights and Climate Change, 38 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 511 (2010). However, the nature of environmental protection is relative 
compared to more absolute, non-contextual, universal human rights. The goals of much of 
our efforts to control pollution are alien to the common law. Pollution control is less con-
cerned with redressing manifest injuries to existing persons, property owners, and 
ecosystems than with the protections of future generations from public health risks. See 
Daniel A. Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights, Environmental Law, and Statutory Interpre-
tation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 683–91 (1991). 
 8. Cf. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and 
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1130 (2010) (“Other major areas of public law, such as consti-
tutional law . . . are studied and taught as parts of the ongoing self-definition of the political 
community. Nothing commensurate has developed in environmental law.”). 
 9. For an example of the benefits of this cosmopolitan approach to environmental 
law, see Oliver A. Houck, Light from the Trees: The Stories of Minors Oposa and the Russian 
Forest Cases, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2007). 
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I. A SHORT HISTORY OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE 
ORIGINS OF AN INCOMPLETE BODY OF LAW 
Everything about environmental law is contested, but all systems have 
to start off from a base principle. Mine is that the law should take its cues 
from environmentalism. Environmentalism generally refers to a paradigm 
shift in the human-nature dynamic from domination to stewardship that 
stresses the maintenance of natural system functions and the minimization 
of the health, and other, risks of modern technology.10  
Although the radical nature of environmental law and environmental-
ism have been consistently downplayed,11 environmentalism’s primary 
objective is radically transformational. It seeks no less than to replace the 
traditional view that the Earth “is . . . a biophysical system which embraces 
the human economy and makes it possible”12 with a science-based steward-
ship norm.13 The late geographer Gilbert White, an early advocate of  
fundamentally changing resource-use policies, optimistically concluded that 
we have come to “recognize a commitment to care for [the Earth] in perpe-
tuity [and to] accept reluctantly the obligation to come to terms with 
problems posed by growth in numbers and appetites.”14  
Environmentalism began as an effort to switch the paradigm of re-
source use from rapid exploitation to stewardship. Initially, environmental 
protection was seen as a rational extension of the Progressive Conservation 
Movement,15 but it was soon overtaken by two developments: (1) the rise of 
                                                                                                                      
 10. See Lester Milbrath, The World is Relearning Its Story About How the World Works, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 21 (S. Kamienski ed., 1993); 
PASSMORE, supra note 4. 
 11. Mainstream environmental thinking has viewed environmental protection as a 
necessary limitation on private property and individual liberty, but has sought the least 
invasive solutions. See generally Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, Learning from Experience, 
Planning for the Future: Beyond the Parable (and Paradox?) of Environmentalists As Pin-Striped 
Pantheists, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 715 (1986); David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurispru-
dence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619 (1994).  
 12. DONALD HUGHES, AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD: 
HUMANKIND’S CHANGING ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY OF LIFE 209 (2001). 
 13. See infra notes 222–227 and accompanying text. But see MARK SAGOFF, THE 
ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 208 (2d ed. 2008) 
(arguing that U.S. environmentalism is grounded in our historical and religious experience 
and reliance on science is “self-defeating”). 
 14. Gilbert F. White, Reflections on Changing Perceptions of the Earth, 19 ANN. REV. 
ENERGY & ENV’T 1, 9 (1994). 
 15. The Progressive Conservation Movement arose in the late nineteenth century, as 
the frontier era was drawing to a close. It responded to fears that resources such as timber 
were being exhausted and the growing taste among upper class Americans for the preserva-
tion of scenic wonders. There were two strains to the movement. Proponents of rational 
resource management argued that public resources should be managed efficiently using 
scientific principles, rather than given away. The other strain argued that areas of awesome 
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guerilla lawsuits and (2) the extraordinarily rapid Congressional and Execu-
tive responses to political environmentalism between 1970 and 1973.16 A 
holistic perspective was lost in the need to respond quickly to a number of 
media-specific problems that scientists and economists identified. The 
variety of legal responses that these problems generated did not support a 
holistic perspective either.  
Environmental law developed with two core characteristics that make it 
increasingly problematic and unresponsive to the lessons about environ-
mental protection that we have learned in the past four decades. First, from 
the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969 and 
the pollution control statutes that soon followed,17 environmental law de-
veloped almost exclusively as positive, statutory law. Congress enacted a 
series of media-specific programmatic statutes to reduce a wide, but by no 
means complete, range of discrete human insults to the biosphere (primarily 
air and water pollution) as well as to supplement earlier laws that walled off 
scenic fragments of undisturbed “nature” from intensive human use.18 But 
                                                                                                                      
nature should be withdrawn from all development and preserved in perpetuity. The move-
ment thrived during the first two decades of the twentieth century and then again in the 
1930s during the New Deal. See RICHARD L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, 
MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 136–153 
(1999). 
 16. Political environmentalism drew from the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War 
movements, but it enjoyed a much broader base of support because there was no serious 
opposition to changing the status quo of pollution and ecosystem disruption. The Council 
on Environmental Quality noted that “[t]he environmental outlook, with its opposition to 
careless impersonal use of technology in a way that destroys life . . . , had strong spiritual 
ties with the peace movement and the ethical climate of the 1960s.” COUNCIL ON ENVTL. 
QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 10 (1979), available at http://slideshare.net/whitehouse/august-
1979-the-tenth-annual-report-of-the-council-on-environmental-quality. 
 17. For a general overview, see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004), which recounts the standard history of modern environmen-
tal law. There is also a long and rich pre-history of modern environmental law. See, e.g., 
DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE 
CRUSADE FOR AMERICA (2009) (tracing Theodore Roosevelt’s interest in science and the 
beauty of nature, and its influence on his public land withdrawal decisions); KARL BOYD 
BROOKS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2009) (describing the influ-
ence of pollution laws enacted in the 1940s and 1950s and anti-dam campaigns on modern 
environmental law); FDR AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Henry L. Henderson & David B. 
Woolner eds., 2005) (examining FDR’s deep interest in the balance between humans and 
nature, and the legacy of New Deal natural resource planning and land policy). However, 
modern environmental law did not develop as a distinct body of law capable of supporting 
specialized law school courses and a specialized practice until 1970. 
 18. Two important precursor statutes, the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
1336 (2006) and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2006), 
were important inroads into the idea of multiple use (i.e., intensive development of public 
lands and waters). 
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these statutes never produced a holistic approach to what came to be called 
“the environment.”19 They were seldom read against a common law or con-
stitutional base or taken as a source of new general principles.20  
Much of the blame can be placed on the Supreme Court. It has treated 
environmental law as just a branch of administrative law and statutory 
interpretation. And the Court’s well-documented hostility, or at best indif-
ference, towards the project21 has stifled the development of any core 
principles.22 
The second problematic characteristic of U.S. environmental law is that 
it is primarily procedural rather than substantive. The statutes have created 
powerful processes for making science-based decisions,23 have profoundly 
                                                                                                                      
 19. Writing about the rise of environmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s, Richard N. L. 
Andrews observed, “[t]he most revolutionary element of the new public consciousness was 
the powerful new awareness of the environment as a living system—a ‘web of life’ or 
ecosystem—rather than just a storehouse of commodities to be extracted or a chemical 
machine to be manipulated.” ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 202. 
 20. E.g., David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigation 
in the United States, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,644, 10,647 (July 2010) (finding 
most climate change lawsuits are based on statutory, not common law or constitutional, 
claims).  
 21. The leading article is Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About 
Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703 (2000). Nothing has changed 
since this article was published. 
 22. The closest the Court came is in Justice Marshall’s dissent in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 
427 U.S. 390, 415 (1976). The majority held that the Department of Interior did not have to 
prepare a regional impact statement for the Northern Great Plains coal region before they 
could issue individual coal leases. The Department had at various times identified the region 
as the suitable scale for coordinated energy impacts assessment, but the majority held that 
there was no proposed regional plan of development and thus there was no “federal action” 
on a regional scale that triggered NEPA. Id. at 414. In a partial dissent, Justice Marshall 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that a court may not remedy a NEPA violation “no 
matter how blatant—until it is too late for an adequate remedy to be formulated.” Id. at 415 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that the impact statement requirement “seems designed 
as no more than to serve as a catalyst for the development of a ‘common law’ of NEPA.” Id. 
 23. Every word in the above sentence has been contested by environmental law 
scholars and others. At one extreme are those who claim that “good” science is the only basis 
for environmental protection decisions since science has defined the problems that we 
consider environmental. See, e.g., Deborah M. Brosnan & Martha J. Groom, The Integration 
of Conservation Science and Policy: The Pursuit of Knowledge Meets the Use of Knowledge, in 3 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 625, 625 (Martha J. Groom et al. eds., 2006) 
(“[C]onservation science [must be] a central component of environmental decisions,  
policies, and laws.”) (citation omitted); Dan J. Rohlf, Science, Law, and Policy in Managing 
Natural Resources: Toward a Sound Mix Rather than a Sound Bite, in FOREST FUTURES 127, 129 
(Karen Arabas & Joe Bowersox eds., 2004) (“[S]uccessful management strategies must rest 
on . . . policy decisions informed . . . by a clear science process . . . . ”). At the other extreme 
are those who claim that all decisions are effectively value judgments, and thus value trump 
science. See, e.g., SAGOFF, supra note 13. This Article takes the middle position that while 
environmental decisions must be grounded in science, science can never fully answer  
the questions posed for regulators. Thus, value judgments are always necessary to make 
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changed the way that we use air, water and public and private land, and 
have increased the level of public health protection that we provide our 
citizens by substantially reducing the discharge of untreated waste streams24 
and the use of many chemicals that pose serious public health risks. But 
process has become an end in and of itself; the link between process and 
substance has not developed as hoped. 
A. Environmental Protection Develops as a Logical Extension  
of the Benign, Expert New Deal State 
What we now call “environmental law” did not exist prior to 1965. The 
term “environmental protection” slowly emerged in the 1960s among policy 
elites, but the public discourse centered on “nature protection” and “re-
source conservation.”25 The seminal idea of respecting nature first appeared 
on the political agenda during the Theodore Roosevelt administration 
(1901–1909).26 The first decade of the twentieth century was the zenith of 
the Progressive Conservation Movement. Roosevelt’s commitment to con-
servation embraced preservation of scenic wonders and other public lands, 
which served to support what we now call biodiversity, and public  
ownership of the land, which served efficient, science-based management 
and exploitation. 
Conservation’s appeal faded during the rapacious and corrupt 1920s.27 
The movement had a rebirth in the 1930s during the New Deal,28 but by 
the 1950s it had again lost its widespread appeal. However, bitter regional 
                                                                                                                      
decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty. See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, 
Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resources Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. 
REV. 1 (2005). 
 24. No comprehensive evaluation of the effects of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act exists, but the various proxy measures demonstrate major improvements over the 1970 
baseline, although many problems such as nutrient loading and combined sanitary sewer and 
storm water overflows remain. Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, 
Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution 
Control Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 130 (2010) (“By all accounts, the 
CWA has made significant inroads into the nation’s water pollution problems.”). The EPA 
estimates that the Clean Air Act will produce $2 trillion in benefits by 2020. EPA, OFFICE 
OF AIR & RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 
2020, at 7-3 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/sect812/feb11/fullreport.pdf.  
 25. The modern environmental movement’s strategy of defining a problem as “envi-
ronmental,” crafting a technical solution, and selling it to legislatures is questioned in a 
much discussed memo by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, THE DEATH OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: GLOBAL WARMING POLITICS IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD 
(2004). 
 26. BRINKLEY, supra note 17. 
 27. See J. LEONARD BATES, THE ORIGINS OF TEAPOT DOME, PROGRESSIVES, 
PARTIES AND PETROLEUM: 1909–1921, at 200 (1963). 
 28. FDR AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 17. 
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political fights over public lands issues, such as grazing fees and the dam-
ming of scenic canyons, occasionally attracted national attention29 and laid 
the groundwork for the modern environmental movement. 
Modern environmentalism emerged in the 1960s and has been ex-
plained as the product of both post-World War II affluence, which gave the 
U.S. public a taste for beauty and recreation,30 and anxiety arising from the 
Cold War’s reliance on atomic weapons.31 The loss of open space around 
urban areas, fears about radiation exposure, the linkage of visible pollution 
(smog) to the internal combustion engine, the suspected health and ecosys-
tem harm caused by synthetic chemicals such as DDT, and the 1969 Santa 
Barbara oil spill all suggested that public health and ecosystem disasters 
caused by inadequately regulated technology and applied science would 
only increase.32 Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring33 alerted the public to the 
dangers of uncontrolled chemical use. The book resonated with many peo-
ple who were already concerned about the adverse effects of radiation from 
the construction of nuclear power plants. Aldo Leopold’s earlier A Sand 
County Almanac34 became the environmentalists’ scripture; its call for a land 
ethic resonated with affluent post-World War II suburbanites witnessing 
the disappearance of open space and possessing the resources to enjoy 
wilderness. 
In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1960–1968), environmen-
tal protection was a rational dialogue between a few cabinet officials, 
legislators (and their staffs), and representatives of the old-line conserva-
tion groups. Rational environmentalism was the last burst of faith in the 
expert administrative state’s ability to advance the public good. The domi-
nant liberal view was that the problems of governance were technical rather 
than ideological. Environmental policy was seen as a new government 
effort to unify the diffuse demands for more open space for recreation, a 
more beautiful landscape, less visible pollution, and better control of 
science and technology. The dedicated creators of early modern environ-
mental policy saw environmental protection as an extension of the New 
                                                                                                                      
 29. BROOKS, supra note 17 passim. 
 30. Many historians emphasize the post-World War II roots of modern environmen-
talism, such as leisure and the dissemination of information about the negative effects of the 
fruits of World War II research: pesticides and atomic power. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 
15, at 201–02; SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955–1985, at 3 (1987). 
 31. ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 212–13. 
 32. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION & POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON 
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1945–
1975, at 263–77 (1977) (discussing the relationship between pollution crises and new  
pollution control legislation). 
 33. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
 34. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949). 
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Deal state.35 The main players were to be Congress and reformed “expert 
agencies.”36 
However, the intellectual groundwork for the ensuing environmental 
decade (1969–1980) can be traced to this period. Visionary government 
leaders like Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, Senator Henry Jackson 
of Washington, and Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin began to adapt 
the Progressive and New Deal conservation traditions to the challenges 
posed by Carson and Leopold.37 Secretary Udall (1960–1968) played a key 
role in replacing preservation with the new construct of environmental 
protection. He built on the conservationist legacy, but also recognized the 
fundamental paradigm shift that environmentalism posed. For example, he 
wrote that Silent Spring “spurred new lines of thought about resources and 
the limits of technology that began to alter the thinking of my genera-
tion.”38 Secretary Udall, and others, came to realize that new federal 
legislation was needed to make it difficult for agencies to argue that they 
had no authority to protect the environment, to control all major sources of 
air and water pollution, or to evaluate the health and environmental risks 
posed by the use of synthetic organic pesticides. This realization culminated 
in NEPA. 
B. Environmental Law Becomes a Legal Guerilla Movement 
Today, environmental protection is deeply embedded in U.S. law; it is a 
recognized practice area and has been embraced by the academy.39 However, 
its establishment trappings belie the guerilla origins of the subject. These 
origins continue to shape the law today, even though it is almost entirely 
statutory.  
The post-New Deal rationalists were caught off-guard when environ-
mentalism briefly erupted into a mass movement driven by fear of imminent 
                                                                                                                      
 35. See generally LAZARUS, supra note 17; A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Then 
and Now, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2010). 
 36. For example, Professor L.K. Caldwell, the father of NEPA’s “action-forcing” 
environmental impact statement requirement, “clearly contemplated an important oversight 
role for the Bureau of the Budget.” RICHARD A. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH 16 (1976). 
 37. STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS AND THE NEXT GENERATION 195 (1988). 
 38. Id. Udall defended Silent Spring in the 1964 Saturday Review of Literature at a time 
when the chemical industry was spending large amounts of money to discredit the book. 
Secretary Udall, among others, imported Carson’s basic lessons into the legislative history of 
NEPA. 
 39. The editors of the Land Use & Environment Law Review, which reprints the best 
ten to eleven articles in these two related fields chosen by two tiers of peer screening, 
reported in 2010 that they started with a list of 300 plus articles. LAND USE & 
ENVIRONMENT LAW REVIEW, at v (A. Dan Tarlock & David L. Callies eds., 2010/2011 ed. 
2010). 
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threats to public health, concerns about the “destruction” of nature, and a 
deepening rejection of the expert state, the legitimacy of which had been 
perhaps fatally weakened by the Vietnam War. Lawyers were influenced by 
the movement and soon became frustrated with what they perceived as 
unresponsive, hostile, and narrow-mission federal agencies and the New 
Deal administrative law premised on deference to these agencies.40 Lawyers 
began to create environmental law out of whole cloth by following the civil 
rights model. They turned to the suddenly “wiser” courts for relief from an 
unresponsive political system.41  
The challenge was formidable. There was no constitutional basis on 
which to litigate,42 the common law was not considered up to the task of 
controlling persistent pollution,43 and such scattered conservation legislation 
that existed conferred virtually unreviewable discretion on agencies and 
departments.44 Occasionally the government had to defend a preservation 
decision in court,45 but the idea that a non-governmental organization could 
                                                                                                                      
 40. The New Deal State was based on the ability of experts to articulate the public 
interest. This ability came under heavy assault from various sources. Public Choice Theory, 
which originated with ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) 
and JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962), totally rejected the idea of a 
public interest. See also MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (another important work in Public Choice 
Theory that rejects the idea of public interest). MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING 
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955) popularized the notion of regulatory 
capture. Regulatory capture posits that the industry regulated by an agency will use its 
political and economic power to use the agency for its own benefit, including the suppres-
sion of competition. Professor Richard Stewart synthesized these theories and argued that 
the role of courts was not to shield agencies from political influence, as New Deal theorists 
posited, but to ensure that the agencies’ decisions adequately considered all relevant inter-
ests. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1799 (1975). 
 41. David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Adminis-
trative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 618 (1970). 
 42. Describing the state of the law in the 1970s, Professor William Rodgers wrote that 
“a faithful reporter might be drawn to the conclusion: not then, not now, not ever. The early 
1970s saw a number of failed attempts to place recognition of environmental values in the 
U.S. Constitution.” WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 63–64 (2d ed. 
1994). 
 43. In his pioneering environmental law casebook, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY, now University of Michigan Professor James E. Krier observed, “[i]t should be 
clear from the materials considered . . . that effective pollution control is impossible without 
some form of government intervention, and that intervention through the judicial system 
alone is not enough.” JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 293 (1971).  
 44. Charles A. Reich, The Public and the Nation’s Forests, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 393 
(1962). 
 45. E.g., Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 216 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 
1954) (finding that the Federal Power Commission has authority to deny federal power 
license to preserve free-flowing rivers). 
  
170 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 1:1 
challenge a decision not to preserve a resource was almost unthinkable 
because it was so at variance with the New Deal vision that courts should 
defer to agency expertise except for in the case of a clear violation of a 
procedural or substantive right. Standing seemed limited to those with a 
common law or statutory right to sue, although the Supreme Court was 
expanding the ability of competitors to assert an interest in unfavorable 
administrative decisions.46  
Lawyers followed the great common law tradition left open to socially 
marginal groups and pursued a “rule of law litigation” strategy. New Deal 
expert agencies were reclassified as ossified, concrete-pouring mission 
agencies. To rein in these agencies, lawyers created the fiction that the 
recognition of new environmental protection duties merely required courts 
to perform their traditional and constitutionally legitimate function of 
applying and enforcing—rather than creating—clear, pre-existing rules.47 
They also convinced courts, and ultimately Congress, that environmental 
enforcement had to be shared between the agencies and citizens operating 
through non-governmental organizations.48  
This legal guerillaism began in 1965 when the Second Circuit decided 
the first true environmental law case. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence v. Federal Power Commission, Scenic Hudson challenged a Federal 
Power Commission (FPC) license for a pump storage project at scenic and 
iconic Storm King Mountain on the Hudson River in New York State. It 
was a classic elite challenge to an act of aesthetic desecration. In an unprec-
edented decision, plaintiffs convinced the Second Circuit to remand the 
license for further proceedings.49 The court essentially endorsed citizen 
standing to represent non-economic, aesthetic interests. On the merits, the 
court read a broad regulatory statute, the Federal Power Act, which at best 
conferred discretion on the agency to consider aesthetic values (a then 
much contested idea), to impose mandatory duties on an agency to consider 
these and other environmental values and to more fully justify decisions not 
to protect those values.50 However, after new hearings, the FPC reissued 
                                                                                                                      
 46. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156–58 (1970). 
 47. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593, 601 (D. Colo. 1970) (suggest-
ing that the Forest Service had a mandatory duty to recommend to the President and 
Congress that an area of a national forest should be included in the National Wilderness 
Preservation System).  
 48. I have developed this idea at greater length in A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of 
Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575 (2002). To convince a 
court to enjoin or remand an action, lawyers argued that the agency had violated a specific 
procedural or substantive provision of a statute. Thus, courts were applying, not making, law. 
 49. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 625 (2d Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
 50. The plaintiffs were aided by the fact that, a decade earlier, the Commission had 
successfully defended its authority to deny a license to protect a free-flowing river. 
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the license and the Second Circuit refused to second guess the remanded 
decision.51  
Scenic Hudson encouraged lawyers on the frontline of environmental 
law to turn the then-dominant legal process school52 on its head by positing 
that courts, not legislatures, were the best fora in which to resolve value-
laden “polycentric” resource use disputes.53 But most lawyers assumed that 
the best the courts could do was order, in Joseph Sax’s words, either a legis-
lative or an administrative remand.54 Thus, Scenic Hudson, innovative as it 
was, cast environmental law as primarily procedural. Litigation became a 
tactic to delay undesired projects and regulatory decisions—giving oppo-
nents the opportunity to mobilize political support against these 
projects—rather than a means to obtain a final adjudication of a legal issue 
on the merits.  
Professor Sax’s remand theory proved to be extremely prescient. The 
combination of NEPA and the suite of pollution control and natural re-
sources management laws that followed, reinforced by judicial receptivity to 
non-governmental organization “hard look” suits55 challenging the agencies’ 
failure to follow either the letter or spirit of these laws, created the field of 
environmental law as a negative body of law based on finding fault with a 
decision-making process, much as earlier lawyers picked apart writ plead-
ing. 
Environmental advocates and lawyers did not remain legally or politi-
cally marginalized for long, although, in many ways, they never shed the 
outsider role. After environmentalism emerged as a powerful political force 
in 1969,56 Congress immediately responded by federalizing many aspects of 
                                                                                                                      
Namekagon Hydro Co., 216 F.2d at 513; see also A. Dan Tarlock et al., Environmental Regulation 
of Power Plant Siting: Existing and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 502, 514–23 (1972). 
 51. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 453 F.2d 463, 
481–82 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 52. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958). 
 53. Sive, supra note 41, at 629. 
 54. JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN 
ACTION 175–92 (1971). For another version of this theory, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1999). 
 55. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 (1971) 
(“[T]he court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry 
into facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.”) 
(citations omitted). The phrase “hard look” was actually coined by Judge Harold Leventhal 
in several cases, most importantly in Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 
444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 56. ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 224–26. The term “environment” is widely used in 
domestic and international law, but no consensus about its meaning exists. It is also often 
equated with “ecosystem.” E.g., Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., July 30, 1993) 
(Phil.), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 174, 187 (1994) (granting standing to the children of a Filipino 
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environmental protection, from pollution control to what we now call bio-
diversity conservation.57 Environmental protection became a widely accepted 
goal of both the modern and the post-modern (minimal) regulatory state. 
Modern environmental law quickly followed. The statutes contained posi-
tive, substantive standards. As this Article illustrates, however, courts 
accepted the substantive standards, but concentrated on the processes and 
procedures by which these standards were adopted and applied. 
In retrospect, the rapid rise of environmentalism had unintended adverse 
consequences because the perceived need for urgent action gave no time to 
debate and reflect on what the long-run objectives of environmental law should 
be. The immediate objective seemed obvious: reverse the status quo of re-
source use and “abuse.”58 Lawyers trying to prevent pollution and ecosystem 
impairment quickly went from having no law available to having too much 
law and judicial interpretation, all of which had to be mastered and applied.59  
As a result of this rapid transformation, environmental law has, for all 
of its density, two linked fundamental weaknesses: it does not sufficiently 
constrain enough human behavior to compel consistent outcomes that can 
be classified as environmental,60 and it remains highly vulnerable to politi-
cal shifts. In the face of pressure, decision makers can trim their sails 
relatively easily by trading off environmental protection against other objec-
tives, even though it is now harder to do this than it was before the 1970s.  
I do not argue that the fairness, rationality, transparency, and demo-
cratic legitimacy of all laws, and the processes that they create, are 
unimportant. The evidence is strong that environmental protection is still 
better in democratic than in autocratic countries.61 I also do not argue that 
                                                                                                                      
citizen to challenge logging permits, and speaking of the “right to a healthful ecology” and 
to a “sound environment”).  
 57. Congress had begun the process in the 1950s, but did not mandate that pollution 
emissions be reduced until the Clean Air Act of 1970. See LAZARUS, supra note 17. 
 58. ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 229. 
 59. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Statutory 
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003). 
 60. There has been surprisingly little discussion of what makes a problem “environ-
mental.” The leading environmental law scholar Richard Lazarus has argued that the 
primary factor is ecological injury, which has six features: (1) irreversibility, (2) injuries 
physically distant from the source of a discharge, (3) temporally distant (non-imminent) 
injuries, (4) uncertainty and risk, (5) multiple causes, and (6) noneconomic and nonhuman 
injuries. Lazarus, supra note 21, at 745–48. Risk and uncertainty are closely related, but risk 
refers to quantifiable probabilities, while uncertainty refers to probabilities that are unquan-
tifiable. Most environmental issues, from the impacts of climate change to the reduction of 
cancer and other toxic harms, are true uncertainty problems. See Daniel A. Farber, Uncer-
tainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901 (2011). 
 61. JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 
(2005); Margrethe Winslow, Is Democracy Good for the Environment?, 48 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & 
MGMT. 771 (2005) (finding that more democracy leads to less pollution). 
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environmental values, however defined, should prevail in every instance. I 
make the “softer” argument that if concerns such as biodiversity62 loss, the 
adverse impacts of climate change, and the long-term risks of exposure to 
toxic substances are valid, the law must go beyond designing fair processes 
because the fragile nature of positive environmental law subordinates sub-
stantive outcomes to process.63 In addition to better procedures, we need to 
ensure that decisions more consistently adhere to protection norms, at least 
in ways that preserve options as better information emerges.  
The primary message of environmentalism, demonized as it is as a 
false, doomsday one,64 remains that we are running an uncontrolled exper-
iment with the ability of the planet to absorb numerous anthropogenic 
shocks to evolved planetary life support systems. The main conclusion that 
I draw from this message65 is that the margin of error for “bad” environ-
mental decisions is smaller than for almost any other area of law.  
Climate change, or “climate disruption,” is perhaps the best example. 
To realize the benefits of industrial development, humans have altered 
historic climate cycles both on land and in the oceans.66 We are acidifying 
the oceans as they warm,67 as well as insulting them in other ways.68  
                                                                                                                      
 62. I do not underestimate the difficulties of turning broad scientific “teachings” into 
law. The history of the biodiversity construct is detailed in DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF 
BIODIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE (1996). For an excellent analysis of the difficul-
ty of developing a law of biodiversity conservation, see Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity 
Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 364 (2004). 
 63. Elizabeth Garrett, The Story of TVA v. Hill: Congress Has the Last Word (Univ. of 
S. Cal. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 54, 2009), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lss/art54 (suggesting that the case establishing the Endan-
gered Species Act as a substantive mandate to protect listed species regardless of 
opportunity costs of protection actually illustrates that Congress can easily override a statute 
by “passing a clearly worded provision within the text of annual appropriations bills”). 
 64. The leading exponent of the theory that problems such as overpopulation and 
resource destruction are not serious is Bjørn Lomborg. See BJØRN LOMBORG, THE 
SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST (2001). However, he now argues that climate change is real 
and we must adapt in a “smart” manner. BJØRN LOMBORG, SMART SOLUTIONS TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2010). Needless to say, Lomborg remains extremely controversial. See HOWARD 
FRIEL, THE LOMBORG DECEPTION: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ABOUT GLOBAL 
WARMING (2010). 
 65. See infra note 73. 
 66. E.g., BILL MCKIBBEN, EAARTH: MAKING A LIFE ON A TOUGH NEW PLANET (2010). 
 67. See S. Levitus et al., Global Ocean Heat Content 1955–2008 in Light of Recently 
Revealed Instrumentation Problems, 36 GEOPHYS. RES. LETTERS L07608 (2009). Oceans have 
absorbed about eighty percent of the heat added to the climate system since 1955. 
MICHELLE ALLSOPP ET AL., STATE OF THE WORLD’S OCEANS 159 (2009). The impact of this 
temperature increase includes coral bleaching and a thinning Arctic ice cap. Id. at 161–70.  
 68. Other insults include the destruction of coral reefs, overfishing, the introduction 
of dangerous amounts of debris, the loss of biodiversity, and the creation of nutrient-rich 
dead zones. See ALLSOPP, supra note 67. 
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Climate change aside, we continue to destroy biodiversity at a rapid 
rate.69 And we have endangered human and ecosystem health through 
massive nitrogen loading.70 The long-term impacts of disasters such as the 
2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill are more ambiguous.71 The spill both caused 
immediate damage and exacerbated an already stressed ecosystem. The 
question of exactly how big a margin of error we have, given the resilience 
of many ecosystems, remains open.72  
The basic point is that the fragility of environmental law increases the 
risk that we will exceed available margins of error. Law contributes to the 
thin margin of error once a trade-off or a decision not to address an envi-
ronmental issue is made because the legal basis for a mid-course correction 
may be lacking. Positive environmental law is fragile because it is highly 
vulnerable to shifts in political opinion and electoral swings. Environ-
mental protection has survived two roll-back efforts—the first Reagan 
administration and the George W. Bush administration pursued aggressive, 
pro-industry, deregulatory agendas73—and is now facing a third.74 The 
                                                                                                                      
 69. See Stuart H. Butchart et al., Global Biodiversity: Indicators of Recent Declines, 328 
SCIENCE, Apr. 26, 2010, at 1164, 1165, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/science/ 
118752v1? (“Our analyses suggest that biodiversity has continued to decline over the last four 
decades . . . .”). 
 70. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 2000, 
AT 27–29 (1999), available at http://www.unep.org/Geo2000/english/index.htm. 
 71. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL SPILL AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 178–85 (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/ 
final-report. The difficulties of assessing the sea floor, as opposed to surface damages, are 
discussed in Mark Schrope, Deep Wounds, NATURE, Apr. 14, 2011, at 152. 
 72. The heroic efforts to save the California condor are another example of the 
fragility, interconnectedness and uncertainty that surround ecosystem conservation. Condors 
are nesting in Big Sur, but their eggs are weak because they may be feeding on sea lions 
tainted by a DDT hot spot from the 1950s and 1960s off the coast of Los Angeles. John 
Moir, New Hurdle for California Condors May Be DDT From Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES, November 
16, 2010, at D3. 
 73. See Amanda Little, The Rollback Machine: Keeping Tabs on the Bush Administration’s 
Environmental Record, GRIST (Sept. 4, 2003, 9:00 AM), http://www.grist.org/article/rollback; 
see also John D. Leshy, Natural Resources Policy in the Bush (II) Administration: An Outsider’s 
Somewhat Jaundiced Assessment, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 347 (2004) (discussing the 
George W. Bush administration’s rollback of existing regulations protecting public lands and 
resources); John M. Carter et al., Cutting Science, Ecology, and Transparency Out of National 
Forest Management: How the Bush Administration Uses the Judicial System to Weaken Environ-
mental Laws, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,959, 10,960 (Dec. 2003) (pointing out 
systematic deregulation of protections for national forests); Joel A. Mintz, ‘Treading Water’: 
A Preliminary Assessment of EPA Enforcement During the Bush II Administration, 34 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,912 (2004) (describing the George W. Bush administration’s 
failure to enforce environmental laws governing water pollution). 
 74. Suzanne Goldenberg, Republicans Attack Obama’s Environmental Protection From All 
Sides, GUARDIAN (UK) (March 4, 2011, 3:05 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2011/mar/04/republicans-attack-obamas-environmental-protection. 
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current wave of anti-environmental legislative proposals, budget riders, and 
oversight hearings represents the most ambitious rollback since the envi-
ronmental decade, the 1970s.  
Environmentalism’s survival may be a hollow victory. Until the twen-
ty-first century, very few public officials or members of the “regulated 
community” wanted to be formally identified as anti-environmental, but 
this is no longer the case.75 The very idea of environmental regulation is 
                                                                                                                      
 75. Upon receiving Harvard Medical School’s Global Environment Citizen Award in 
2004, Bill Moyers made the following remarks: 
One of the biggest changes in politics in my lifetime is that the delusional is no 
longer marginal . . . . For the first time in our history, ideology and theology hold 
a monopoly of power in Washington. Theology asserts propositions that cannot be 
proven true; ideologues hold stoutly to a world view despite being contradicted by 
what is generally accepted as reality. When ideology and theology couple, their 
offspring are not always bad but they are always blind. And there is the danger: 
voters and politicians alike, oblivious to the facts. 
Remember James Watt, President Reagan’s first secretary [sic] of the Interior? My 
favorite online environmental journal, the ever-engaging Grist, reminded us re-
cently of how James Watt told the U.S. Congress that protecting natural resources 
was unimportant in light of the imminent return of Jesus Christ. In public testi-
mony he said, “after the last tree is felled, Christ will come back.” 
. . . .  
A 2002 Time/CNN poll found that 59 percent of Americans believe that the 
prophecies found in the book of Revelations [sic] are going to come true. Nearly 
one-quarter think the Bible predicted the 9/11 attacks. Drive across the country 
with your radio tuned to the more than 1,600 Christian radio stations . . . and you 
can hear some of this end-time gospel. And you will come to understand why 
people under the spell of such potent prophecies cannot be expected, as Grist puts 
it, “to worry about the environment. Why care about the earth, when the 
droughts, floods, famine and pestilence brought by ecological collapse are signs of 
the apocalypse foretold in the bible? Why care about global climate change when 
you and yours will be rescued in the rapture? And why care about converting from 
oil to solar when the same god who performed the miracle of the loaves and fishes 
can whip up a few billion barrels of light crude with a word?”  
Bill Moyers, Battlefield Earth, ALTERNET (Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.alternet.org/story/20666. 
Although the Evangelical Christian community remains divided over environmental-
ism, the strain that sees environmental protection as unnecessary seems dominant. See, e.g., 
‘The Planet Won’t Be Destroyed by Global Warming Because God Promised Noah,’ Says Politician 
Bidding to Chair U.S. Energy Committee, DAILY MAIL (UK) (Nov. 10, 2010, 12:31 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1328366/John-Shimkus-Global-warming-wont-destroy-
planet-God-promised-Noah.html#ixzz1G1sRNRky. The current view is that God will 
somehow protect the planet from climate disruption. See id. for a discussion of  
Republican Representative John Shimkus’s speech before the House Energy Subcommittee 
he was hoping to chair in which he insisted we should not be concerned about the planet 
being destroyed because God promised Noah it would not happen again after the great 
flood: “As long as the earth endures, seed time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and 
winter, day and night, will never cease.” Id. (quoting Genesis 8:22). 
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now being questioned. Its positive nature gives Congress complete discre-
tion to roll back or eliminate the substantive core that has held constant 
since 1970, even as new problems, such as climate change or biodiversity 
loss, present greater challenges.76 
II. OBJECTIONS TO THE QUEST FOR A SUBSTANTIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Fortune is guiding our affairs better than we ourselves could have wished. 
Do you see over yonder, friend Sancho, thirty or forty hulking giants? I 
intend to do battle with them and slay them. With their spoils we shall 
begin to be rich for this is a righteous war and the removal of so foul a 
brood from off the face of the earth is a service God will bless.77 
— Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra 
The most basic objection to my thesis is that a quest for a substantive, 
non-positivist environmental law is, pure and simple, a quixotic exercise in 
windmill tilting because environmental law is inherently procedural. 
All that we can expect from the law is a structure to resolve resource 
conflicts that gives some weight to environmental protection. As Rodgers 
and Hammerstein wrote in Oklahoma!, “Ev’rythin’s up to date in Kansas 
City; They’ve gone about as fur as they c’n go!”78 One can derive a set of 
procedural principles from this positivist base and the “reasoned,” “princi-
pled” judicial gloss on environmental statutes,79 but the end product will 
                                                                                                                      
The Montana State Legislature is considering legislation to reverse the funding of 
studies that conclude the arid state faces many adverse consequences of global climate 
disruption. David Sirota, Mad Scientists in the Labs of Democracy, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 18, 
2011, at A12, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/03/18/ 
EDF31IE2FP.DTL. The bill, as proposed, “would declare that ‘global warming [would be] 
beneficial to . . . Montana.’ ” Id.  
 76. For an excellent articulation of the challenges that climate change poses for law, 
see J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
 77. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, THE INGENIOUS GENTLEMAN DON 
QUIXOTE OF LA MANCHA ch. 8 (Walter Starkie trans., 1964) (1605).  
 78. Richard Rogers & Oscar Hammerstein II, Kansas City, on OKLAHOMA! (1943). 
 79. The path-breaking decision in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Commission, Inc. v. U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) to engage in an in-depth review of 
environmental impact established the idea that courts had a large role in determining the 
scope of legislatively-mandated procedures. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: 
The Court Construes the National Environmental Policy Act to Create A Powerful Cause of Action, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, eds., 2005). 
The Supreme Court subsequently reduced the scope of Environmental Impact Statements 
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inevitably be an environmentally agnostic method of making decisions. 
This objection has both the merits of positivism and of tradition. It de-
scribes the way in which environmental law has developed.80 It also fits 
with the tradition of the great schools of U.S. jurisprudence: legal realism, 
the legal process school, law and society, and critical legal studies are all 
concerned primarily with method rather than with substance.81 In the lan-
guage of non-equilibrium ecology, environmental law has reached its 
successive climax stage and cannot evolve beyond its current state.82  
This view has been articulated by Professor Todd Aagaard in his criti-
cism of my argument, advanced in an earlier article,83 that the primary 
measure of the effectiveness of environmental law is whether it advances 
the project of environmental protection.84 He admits that the field of envi-
ronmental law exists, but he asserts that any effort to chart the contours of 
the field and define a conceptual core in a unitary fashion is futile because 
it obscures “many of the most vexing tradeoffs facing environmental deci-
sion makers.”85  
To Professor Aagaard, the distinctive features of environmental law 
are the mediation of conflicts between private and public use of shared 
resources from watersheds to public lands, the interrelatedness of the exter-
nal costs of human consumption and resource use, the spatial and temporal 
disjunction between cause and effect, and the ever-wicked problem of sci-
entific uncertainty.86 Thus, it is immune to overarching general principles. 
“[E]nvironmental law is better understood as a field in which the goal of 
environmental protection sits in a position of constant tension with coun-
tervailing interests and values”87 because a wide variety of trade-offs and 
value conflicts are inevitable. Any search for the type of coherent doctrine 
that characterizes most established fields of law is impossible.88  
                                                                                                                      
(EISs) in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 
519, 558 (1978), but the rule of strict compliance with procedural duties has endured. 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
 81. This point is fully developed in NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1995). 
 82. At the beginning of the environmental decade, ecology was based on the equilib-
rium paradigm. Natural systems evolved toward a steady state or permanent climax stage. 
FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, PLANT SUCCESSION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
VEGETATION (1916). 
 83. Tarlock, supra note 1. 
 84. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxon-
omy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 252–59 (2010). 
 85. Id. at 257. 
 86. The first two characteristics are described as primary and the second two as 
secondary. Id. at 264–73. 
 87. Id. at 263. 
 88. Id. at 277–78. 
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As a descriptive matter, Professor Aagaard is right to characterize envi-
ronmental law as, at best, an organizational framework for the resolution of 
conflicts characterized by both scientific uncertainty and deep value cleav-
ages. As a normative matter, he may also have the better of both the  
realpolitik and jurisprudential arguments. There is considerable support for 
the proposition that procedural guidelines for the legitimacy of complex 
decisions are all that we can expect from a legal system.89 As one who began 
to study environmental law before it existed as a discrete area of law, I do 
not underestimate the wonder at the extent to which modern environmen-
tal law has changed the processes by which public and private 
environmental decisions are made in ways that were unthinkable forty years 
ago. Still, I remain uneasy with this constrained definition of environmen-
tal law. Too often we assemble mountains of data and worry about what 
they may be telling us while continuing to use natural resources in unsus-
tainable ways and continuing to create questionable public health and 
ecosystem risks.90 
We need to transcend the history of environmental law. Yet no compel-
ling non-positive basis for environmental law has emerged because it falls 
outside the Western legal tradition. Environmental law is positive, proce-
dural law for three primary reasons. First, much environmental law involves 
the review of prior agency decisions, and separation of powers principles 
confine the courts to reviewing process rather than substance.91 As the 
                                                                                                                      
 89. Professor Lon Fuller developed a set of criteria for a just or legitimate law, which 
he described as “a procedural version of natural law.” LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
96 (1969). 
 90. My conclusion is shaped by years of serving on National Research Council com-
mittees reviewing the Glen Canyon Dam environmental studies program. Glen Canyon 
Dam impounds the Colorado River above the Grand Canyon. JAMES FARMER, GLEN 
CANYON DAMMED: INVENTING LAKE POWELL & THE CANYON COUNTY (1999). The dam 
discharges colder water at different rates compared to pre-dam flows. The post-dam dis-
charges impact endangered species, the ecology of the riparian zone adjacent to the river, 
and recreational experiences. The Bureau of Reclamation has invested millions in scientific 
studies, but the resulting mountain of studies has not produced “a vision for the future state 
of the Grand Canyon ecosystem.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DOWNSTREAM: ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEM 7 (1999). 
The program and the continuing search for a coherent management plan are detailed in 
Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon: A 
Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2010). I do not underestimate the problems of 
making more sustainable, environmentally suitable choices. As the historian J. Donald 
Hughes has observed, we have yet to come to grips with the need to moderate the accelerat-
ing modification of the planet’s evolved life support systems. HUGHES, supra note 12. 
 91. Of course, courts sometimes reach the merits of a case in the guise of procedural 
review. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1997) (setting 
aside the Secretary of Interior’s decision refusing to list the Canadian Lynx as threatened or 
endangered under the Endangered Species Act after intensive factual review under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard). 
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Tenth Circuit put it, “the arbitrary and capricious standard focuses on the 
rationality of an agency’s decision making [sic] process rather than the 
rationality of the actual decision.”92 Second, environmental problems are 
not as simple as they seemed in the heady early days of the 1970s. They 
are much more wickedly complex due to the scientific uncertainty and 
opportunity costs of environmental protection. They cannot be solved by 
broad, crude scientific or ethical principles. Third, unlike the human rights-
based critique of the military’s use of torture and the extreme deprivation 
of human dignity, there is no compelling, alternative legal-environmental 
narrative to counter the constant pressure to marginalize environmental 
protection.93 The Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson94 created the con-
cept of biophilia, which has theoretical appeal as a suitable candidate for a 
compelling legal-environmental narrative. He argued that “[h]umanity is 
exalted not because we are so far above other living creatures, but because 
knowing them well elevates the very concept of life.”95 Thus, it should 
follow that we are emotionally compelled to protect the environment and 
all forms of life and biodiversity. It is a beautiful idea, but it has no legal or 
substantial popular resonance.  
III. A SUBSTANTIVE BASIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  
THE CANDIDATES 
Environmental academics have long been dissatisfied with the limitations 
of procedural environmental law. They have sought to establish various sub-
stantive principles to make it harder for legislatures, administrative agencies, 
and private parties to marginalize environmental considerations. Various 
substantive candidates have been proposed. The most frequent are: 
1. A constitutional or common law right to a healthy environment 
or to one free of “serious” human health risks. 
                                                                                                                      
 92. Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006). The U.S. 
Supreme Court confirmed this view when it held that NEPA review is confined to the 
adequacy of an environmental impact statement (EIS) rather than the substance of the 
underlying decision. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 
(1980). 
 93. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Building an Environmental Ethic From the Ground Up, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 58 (2003) (“[W]e may have little idea as to what values we are 
protecting through our laws, and our rationale for doing so.”). But see RICHARD P. HISKES, 
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND 
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE (2009) (arguing for environmentalism to be a part of human 
rights). 
 94. Edward O. Wilson influenced the emergence of biodiversity as a construct and a 
justification for much of environmental protection. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE 
DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).  
 95. EDWARD O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA 22 (1984). 
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2. The imposition of a public trust in all public resources, which  
requires that environmental values be given substantial considera-
tion, at least, in all resource allocation and management decisions. 
3. The replacement (or supplementing) of the Lockean idea of 
private property as an exclusive, individual entitlement with 
one that situates land in the larger landscape and imposes bio-
diversity conservation duties on entitlement holders. 
4. A mixed scientific-ethical imperative that extends legal per-
sonality to ecosystems, individual species, or “nature” generally, 
so that society has a right to the maintenance and restoration of 
pre-human intervention, “background” conditions that include 
close to zero exposure to pollutants and toxic chemicals. 
These solutions require either a common law or constitutional basis (or 
substitutes that reject the Western philosophical and liberal traditions) but 
neither have emerged. The first three solutions are off the table, but the 
fourth has some currency. 
A. The Constitution and the Common Law 
1. The Constitution 
Encouraged by the Supreme Court’s early standing decision in Sierra 
Club v. Morton, there have been efforts to ground environmental rights in 
the U.S. Constitution.96 A constitutional right to minimum environmental 
risk and a healthy environment faces two problems. The first is that our 
constitutional jurisprudence imposes few affirmative duties on the govern-
ment. The second is the failure of the environmental ethics project. No 
consensus substantive right has emerged for the Court to incorporate into 
the constitutional framework of human dignity, such as it now is.  
The Constitution has not emerged as a source of environmental values 
because it is primarily a charter of negative liberties and thus imposes no 
affirmative duties on the state except to treat citizens fairly and with some 
dignity.97 Even if this hurdle can be overcome, the content of the potential 
                                                                                                                      
 96. Robert Percival, Greening the Constitution—Harmonizing Environmental and Consti-
tutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 828–29 (2002). 
 97. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding that there is no constitu-
tional text or precedent conferring a right). For a dramatic example of the application of the 
negative-affirmative distinction, see Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). The South African Constitutional Court refused to invalidate Johannesburg’s decision 
to use pre-paid water meters in parts of Soweto, an impoverished area, and post-use billing 
in the wealthy parts of the city. The court found that limited balancing is permitted for 
negative rights that constrain the state, but affirmative human social and economic rights 
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environmental right (or rights) is too contingent compared to other rights 
to be characterized as fundamental. Once one concedes that citizens have 
no right to a zero risk environment, it is not possible to specify with any 
level of confidence the content of a potential right.98 Standards such as a 
right to a healthy, clean, minimal risk environment, although found in 
many constitutions throughout the world, are hopelessly vague.99 For 
example, DNA research has shown that susceptibility to cancer arises from 
an unknown mix of environmental and genetic factors, adding more com-
plications to any effort to recognize a public health-based right.100 The 
problems are magnified when one turns from health to the conservation of 
the physical environment. Not surprisingly, courts have shown almost no 
interest in developing a right to a minimum level of “nature,” or ecosystem, 
conservation.101 Massachusetts v. EPA102 is the closest the Supreme Court has 
come to such a case,103 but the decision is not a foundation on which a 
Constitution-based environmental law can be built.104  
2. The Common Law 
Positive law generally builds off of the common law. Thus, the common 
law has long been proposed as a source of substantive environmental law. 
                                                                                                                      
require a balance between human dignity and the availability of public resources to fulfill 
them. Id. 
 98. Professor Cass Sunstein made this point in his book, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 90 (1990). For an early articulation 
of this view, see Ronald E. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environ-
ment: Toward An Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 204 (1974). See also J.B. Ruhl, The 
Metrics of Constitutional Amendments and Why Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments 
Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (1999) (arguing that constitutional envi-
ronmental rights are not desirable). 
 99. This conclusion continues to be challenged. Victor B. Flatt, This Land is Your Land 
(Our Right to the Environment), 107 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) argues that the common law 
tradition of the protection of the person can evolve to encompass an individual right to a 
clean and safe environment that constrains societal efficiency trade-offs. 
 100. See, e.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public 
Health, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 184 (2005). 
 101. Environmentalists hoped that the public trust doctrine would create such rights, 
but outside of a few water cases in California and Hawaii, courts have not used it to do so. 
See infra text accompanying notes 120–129. 
 102. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 103. Jonathan Z. Cannon has characterized the case as “as close as we will come” to a 
“Brown v. Board of Education for the environment.” Jonathan Z. Cannon, Essay, The Signifi-
cance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 53 (2007), available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cannon.pdf. 
 104. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (describing the case as not “so much . . . an environ-
mental case” as an administrative law case asserting that agency expertise should not be 
made subordinate to presidential political interference). 
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However, a distinctive quasi-common law of environmental protection has 
not emerged. The pollution control branch of environmental law has roots 
in the Western legal, philosophical, and religious tradition, but they are 
shallow. Environmental law is in the Western legal tradition but not of it.105 
That is, environmental law follows the forms of Western legal thinking, but 
it does not fully share the experience or the values of this tradition and 
therefore the tradition does not provide a firm basis for an environmental 
common law.  
There are two great sources of law: the practical and the higher (or di-
vine). Environmental law does not fit well with either.106 Environmental 
law did not grow out of long practical experience adjusting human affairs, 
as did Roman law.107 Nor does environmental law share the Western tradi-
tion’s preoccupation with limiting the power of the state. Instead, despite 
market and libertarian strains, mainstream environmentalism has always 
relied on a strong state to modify established patterns of behavior. 
Rather than arising from the common law, the distinctive feature of  
environmental law has been the enactment of legislation to overcome the 
unresponsiveness of the common law. Statutes such as the Endangered 
Species Act108 and those basing pollution levels or product entry require-
ments on risk assessments109 are a sharp break with the Western legal 
tradition and move the law into uncharted waters. The Endangered Species 
Act extends a level of legal protection to species and their habitats that was 
unknown at common law or in the major Western religious and philosophi-
cal traditions.110 Risk-based standards are equally a major expansion of the 
                                                                                                                      
 105. The concept of being in but not of the world is central to Christian theology and 
means that there is a higher world than the one in which we find ourselves. E.g., John 2:15–17 
(“Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the 
love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world . . . is not of the Father, but is of 
the world . . . .”). 
 106. Of course, this sentence does not do justice to the sweep of Western legal theory 
from the Greeks to the present, but it is nonetheless my attempt to capture the tension 
between law as experience and law as the expression of transcendent norms. See FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER (2011) (asserting that rule of law devel-
oped from eleventh-century canon law); J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN 
LEGAL THEORY (1992) (a complete history of Western legal theory). 
 107. KELLY, supra note 106, at 60–61. 
 108. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
 109. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (2006); Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 110. “Our received ways of defining and handling legal and moral problems grew out 
of relationships among ordinary normal persons living in a collective society.” 
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM 
20 (1987). Legal history provides a few examples of the recognition of a legal personality for 
“nonpersons,” but it was the environmental movement that tried to extend legal personality 
to all flora and fauna, as did Christopher D. Stone in his famous article, Should Trees Have 
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Enlightenment project of protecting human dignity. They essentially pro-
tect future generations of “statistical people.”111 Forcing technology had 
some common law roots and fit with the post-World War II generation’s 
faith in technological progress, but the government’s decision to mandate 
immediate progress was unprecedented. Environmental law is inherently 
visionary, although it appears in formal, tactical guises; it seeks to do no 
less than to replace aspects of the common law that supported centuries of 
abuse of the natural world.  
Ironically, the environmental movement’s early successes using the 
common law created the conditions for its marginalization. In the late 
1960s, environmentalists toyed with the use of the common law of nuisance 
to force polluters to install the necessary pollution reduction technology.112 
After a leading New York Court of Appeals case balanced the equities and 
required polluters to pay damages instead of issuing a technology-forcing 
injunction,113 and after courts generally adhered to the traditional distinction 
between demonstrable damages and speculative risks,114 the action turned to 
legislatures to cure these defects through “comprehensive” legislation.  
The resulting legislation need not have choked off the common law, but 
it did add to its marginalization as a source of substantive environmental 
principles. Inevitably, there are insufficiently addressed issues and new 
problems that the legislation did not contemplate, such as climate change or 
                                                                                                                      
Standing?, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972), and later book, SHOULD TREES HAVE 
STANDING?—TOWARDS LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS (1974). 
 111. The moral basis for this decision is under sustained attack by advocates of cost-
benefit analysis who argue that the relatively immediate and quantifiable benefits of 
regulation must always exceed the costs. Others criticize the use of cost-benefit analysis to 
undermine risk-based regulation intended to protect future generations. See FRANK 
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING 
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). The Western legal tradition has generally used the 
common law to compensate only those actually injured by an activity. Legislatures can 
estimate the likelihood of future harms and can regulate without proving that the absence of 
regulation will actually cause the harms that a statute tries to prevent. However, legislation 
usually deals with demonstrated impacts rather than highly abstract risks, and the beneficiar-
ies of the legislation are primarily assumed to be the living. The difficulty of addressing 
climate change, where neither of these conditions is present, illustrates the influence of this 
tradition. In American Electric Power Institute v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), the 
Court’s dismissal of a federal common law action challenging CO2 emissions on the ground 
that the Clean Air Act preempted such actions is a perfect illustration of the difficulty of 
using the common law to prevent future injuries rather than to redress those that have 
occurred or are imminent. 
 112. WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 113–14 (2d ed. 1994). 
 113. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 114. See, e.g., Brown v. Monsanto Co. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation), 916 F.2d 
829, 850–53 (3d Cir. 1990); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff ’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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the introduction of exotic species into aquatic ecosystems.115 Building on 
Justice Holmes’s visionary opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,116 a 
robust federal common law of nuisance could have emerged.117 However, 
the Supreme Court, taking environmentalists at their word, embraced the 
fiction that the regulatory programs are comprehensive, and thus perfect. 
The result is that almost all federal common law actions are preempted.118 
Another reason for the common law’s limited role is that the federal legisla-
tion imposes duties that go far beyond those that existed at common law 
and has shifted regulation from proof of cause-in-fact to risk assessment.119 
B. The Public Trust 
The common law did help to legitimize pollution control, but no 
analogous common law basis for nature preservation or biodiversity protec-
tion existed. Litigators secured some early successes in remanding public 
decisions that would destroy wetlands or degrade landscapes,120 but no 
constitutional or common law doctrine mandated the preservation of 
nature. The leading academic of the founding generation of environmental 
law, Professor Joseph L. Sax, offered a candidate judicial doctrine.121 He 
turned to the ancient doctrine that “great” rivers are subject to public 
rights, and constructed a general theory of the public trust that could apply 
to all resource use choices.122 
The classic public trust doctrine subjects the state and federal owners 
of the beds of navigable rivers and lakes to judicial constraints when the 
beds and waters are transferred to private ownership or historic public 
                                                                                                                      
 115. Christopher Grubb, Worthy of Their Name: Addressing Aquatic Nuisance Species with 
Common Law Public Nuisance, CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author). 
 116. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
 117. Justice Douglas suggested as much in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105–07 
(1972), but then went on to lay the foundation for the Court’s subsequent preemption 
jurisprudence. 
 118. City of Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. 304, 317–19 (1981); see also Grubb, supra note 
115. 
 119. See Albert C. Lin, Unifying Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 987, 
908, 910–11. But see NOGA MORAG LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR 
POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW STATE (2003) (suggesting that air pollution regulation is 
in keeping with the common law tradition). Nuisance law played a very positive role in 
allowing legislatures to enact stringent pollution control legislation with little fear that 
courts would find it to be a taking without due process of law. See Lin, supra, at 911–12. If 
federal pollution regulation is held unconstitutional, it will be as an unwarranted exercise of 
the commerce power, not as a taking of common law property rights. 
 120. Sax, supra note 54, at 159, 217. 
 121. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
 122. Id. at 556–62. 
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rights are otherwise impaired.123 Professor Sax argued that the public trust 
was both a substantive doctrine, which limited the beds of navigable waters 
to trust purposes, and a procedural one, which forced legislatures and exec-
utives to make more deliberate decisions when environmental values were 
compromised.124 When a decision gave insufficient attention to the public 
interest in maintaining the environmental integrity of a trust resource, a 
court could remand the decision for further administrative or legislative 
deliberation.125  
Sax’s public trust doctrine can be described as a quasi-substantive one. 
Environmental trust values were not per se superior to other uses of the 
resource in question. But the objective of judicial scrutiny and the threat of 
a remand was to force agencies and legislatures to limit the intensive ex-
ploitation of a wide range of resources. The extension of the public trust to 
all public resources excited environmental lawyers in the United States, and 
later lawyers throughout the world, because it could evolve into a law of 
substantive rights. But it remains a promise unfulfilled.  
In contrast to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when much 
land was severed from the trust, transferred to private ownership, and 
filled, the revived public trust doctrine has strengthened state control of 
tidelands and the beds of navigable waters.126 A few scattered precedents 
have applied the doctrine to parks.127 However, courts have not developed a 
public trust law that effectively prevents the disturbance of the status quo 
outside of the water area.128 Beyond water cases, the doctrine offers little 
                                                                                                                      
 123. The leading case is Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
Citing almost no precedent, the Supreme Court held that Illinois could constitutionally 
revoke a previous legislative grant of prime Chicago lakefront to the railroad. “A grant of all 
lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged to be within the legisla-
tive power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its 
face, as subject to revocation.” Id. at 453. 
 124. Sax, supra note 121 at 556–62. 
 125. Sax, supra note 54, at 163–74. 
 126. E.g., Moot v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 161 N.E.2d 410, 418 (Mass. 2007) (holding 
that the Department had not been delegated the authority to exempt developers of multiple 
use project on trust tidelands from statute requiring license to alter navigable water because 
“department has no authority to forego its responsibility to protect the public’s rights in 
tidelands”). 
 127. E.g., Paepke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970). After a federal court 
held that the National Park Service had a duty to acquire the necessary lands to buffer 
Redwood National Park, Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior, 398 F.Supp. 284, 293–94 (N.D. 
Cal. 1975), courts have refused to extend the public trust to federal public lands. 
 128. Academics have provided courts with a variety of justifications for the extension 
of the public trust. This literature is summarized in Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative 
Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution 
Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 71–80 (2010). The highwater mark of 
the doctrine is the California Supreme Court’s use of it to induce the reallocation of water 
from consumptive to in situ environmental uses. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 
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more than a vague idea that the use of “inherently” common resources 
should always be in the public interest.129 
C. Green Property 
Environmental law is sometimes divided into brown (pollution control) 
and green (biodiversity protection) branches.130 As previously mentioned, 
the common law of nuisance has immunized almost all pollution control 
legislation from attack as unconstitutional takings.131 Biodiversity protec-
tion is different because it often requires private property owners to forego 
development or denies a historic privilege to use public lands and waters. 
Thus, environmental land use regulation is much more vulnerable to tak-
ings challenges. To blunt Fifth Amendment challenges to the regulation of 
environmentally sensitive lands, such as wetlands and wildlife habitat, a 
                                                                                                                      
709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983). Los Angeles’ diversions from Mono Lake’s 
tributary streams were tipping the lake’s ecosystem toward collapse. The California Supreme 
Court held that the trust applied to long-held state appropriation permits in navigable 
waters and that the state had a duty to balance environmental uses against other uses. Id. at 
721. A settlement, induced by a $50 million appropriation to finance replacement water for 
Los Angeles, has stabilized the lake. The settlement is described in Leigh A. Jewell & Craig 
Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 
in BEYOND LITIGATION: CASE STUDIES IN WATER RIGHTS DISPUTES 155, 176–180 (Craig 
Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell eds., 2002). 
Hawaii’s Supreme Court has applied the Mono Lake decision to require some level of 
ecosystem restoration when prior water rights are reallocated and trans-watershed diversions 
pose a substantial threat to the maintenance of instream flows. Hawaii has applied the public 
trust doctrine to subordinate municipal claims to instream flow needs, In re Water Use 
Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 432–33 (Haw. 2000), and native Hawaiian rights. In re 
Water Use Permit Application Filed by Kukui Molokai, Inc., 174 P.3d 320, 330 (Haw. 2007); 
In re Waiola O Molokai, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 692 (Haw. 2004); see also David L. Callies & 
Calvert G. Chipchase, Water Regulation, Land Use, and the Environment, 30 HAW. L. REV. 49, 
94 (2007) (criticizing those decisions). 
 129. Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill argue that Professor Sax incorrectly conclud-
ed that the case stands for the proposition that there was no public interest in the legislation. 
Joseph Kearney & Thomas Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What 
Really Happened in Illinois Central?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). The harbor, railroad and 
depot developed on the public trust land were in the public interest. Thus, although the case 
stands for a powerful principle, it is too crude to use the case as an exemplar of the pub-
lic/private imbalance analysis that its supporters advocate. E.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking 
of Inconvenient Truths: A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 
(2007) (providing the most stark articulation of this argument).  
 130. Compare Robert Glicksman et al., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3 (6th ed. 2011), which proposes a three-fold division between 
pollution reduction, the protection of the public from long-term toxic risks, and biodiversity 
conservation. I have collapsed the first two categories since they both deal with reducing 
exposure to various discharges and substances. 
 131. See supra note 119. 
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theory of “green property” has been proposed.132 The goal is to incorporate 
a broadly-defined duty to conserve into classic Blackstonian, liberal proper-
ty rights. The argument is that the natural interconnectedness of land, 
despite arbitrary property divisions produced by the common law, justifies 
more stringent limitations on individual parcel use to protect the integrity 
of remnant ecosystems. The model is a mix of the public trust doctrine and 
ecology.133 Joseph Sax, for example, criticized the Supreme Court’s Lucas 
decision134 for failing to recognize that property should be defined by refer-
ence to larger ecological communities. He, and others, argued either that 
courts should redefine property to include an ecosystem dimension, or that 
the courts should accept the principle that harm to an ecosystem should be 
considered a modern nuisance. “Viewing property through the lens of 
nature’s economy reduces the significance of property lines.”135 The ra-
tionale is that property has always involved the adjustment of individual 
use to social mores or values, without compensation, and that environmen-
talism requires a similar revision. 
A more modest theory of green property has emerged incrementally as 
a result of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lucas. Justice Scalia acknowledged that 
community or societal duties can be a “background” principle to an other-
wise exclusive property right,136 an idea that has a long pedigree in U.S. 
legal history.137 The Lucas majority offered two justifications for regulation 
that substantially deprives an owner of the value of his or her property, one 
narrow and the other broad. Most of the attention has been focused on 
Justice Scalia’s holding that a landowner has no right to compensation if 
“the prescribed use interests were not part of the title to begin with.” His 
                                                                                                                      
 132. The best exposition remains that of Joseph L. Sax in Property Rights and the Econ-
omy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 
(1993) [hereinafter Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature]. See also Craig Anthony 
(Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 281 (2002); Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environ-
mental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347 (1998). 
Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, supra note 34 at 201–26, is often cited as a source of green  
property theory. “Saint” Aldo seems to have intended his land ethic to be a call for private  
landowners to internalize conservation practices. See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Land Ethic and 
Pilgrim Leopold, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 217, 236 (1990). However, Professor Sax and many 
environmental organizations have endorsed discretionary compensation for land owners who 
bear disproportionate conservation burdens. Joseph L. Sax, Land Use Regulation: Time to 
Think About Fairness, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 455, 467–69 (2010). 
 133. See infra text accompanying notes 156–162 (discussing Leopold’s influence on a 
new model of environmental ethics). 
 134. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 135. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature, supra note 132, at 1445. 
 136. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31. 
 137. E.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings 
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996). 
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opinion limited this exception to “background principles of the State’s law 
of property and nuisance already applicable to land ownership.”138 In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy offered a second rationale for title 
limitations; he argued that Justice Scalia’s background principles test was a 
very narrow, backwards-looking one grounded in the Blackstonian vision of 
the common law, which imposes minimal restraints on land development, 
and unjustifiably excluded contemporary biodiversity regulation. Justice 
Kennedy would allow the state to set background principles through legisla-
tion.139  
The problem of adequate notice remains, but the background principles 
test may be broader than Justice Scalia envisioned. There are many com-
mon law doctrines that limit legitimate investment-backed expectations.140 
For example, wildlife habitat protection was a landowner obligation for cen-
turies in England.141 “A landowner . . . might develop his property, but he 
was required to retain adequate vegetation for wildlife forage and cover.”142 
The regulation of water use to preserve endangered species is much easier 
to justify under Lucas. Water rights are inherently limited by the require-
ment that the use be beneficial, as well as by the public trust doctrine.143  
The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that a statutory, regulatory 
scheme alone puts a property owner on notice that entitlements will no 
longer be recognized,144 but it has opened the door to a theory that allows 
the state to “green” property by lowering the expectations of unfettered 
discretion to develop. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island posited that the existence of a statutory, regulatory scheme was 
                                                                                                                      
 138. 505 U.S. at 1004. 
 139. 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy J., concurring). 
 140. There is a vast literature on the scope of background limitations as a basis for 
environmental regulation. The case for a narrow reading of the Lucas exception has been 
articulated by Professor James Huffman. James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the 
Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2008). The argument for an 
expansive reading has been articulated by Professors Michael C. Blumm and J.B. Ruhl. 
Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhl, Background Principles, Takings, and Libertarian Property: A 
Reply to Professor Huffman, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 805 (2010); Michael C. Blumm & Lucas 
Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defens-
es, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 753 (2008). 
 141. See Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996). 
 142. THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 16 (1980). 
 143. But see Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 
(2001) (ruling that the United States must pay for diminished water deliveries as a result of 
ESA compliance). The George W. Bush administration settled this case for $17 million. 
 144. Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 610 (2001). 
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a factor to be considered in deciding the extent of the property owner’s 
legitimate investment-backed expectations.145  
Over time, the continued existence of a regulation will dampen enti-
tlement expectations, but courts have not endorsed, and are unlikely to 
endorse, a radical new theory of “green property.” Ultimately the failed 
project to create a general theory of “green property” illustrates the failure 
of the effort to create a non-positivist basis for a substantive environmental 
law.146  
D. Science-Based Environmental Ethics 
Conservation is a harmony between men and land.147 
—Aldo Leopold 
Environmental law has tried to follow the law and economics model by 
using other disciplines—ecology and, to a lesser extent, toxicology—to 
provide normative standards for a new “quasi–common” or “quasi-
constitutional” law of environmental protection. This is a dicey project. 
Environmental law exists because science has identified problems as “envi-
ronmental,” but modern science has undermined much of the early hope 
that disciplines such as ecology would produce an objective set of prescrip-
tions upon which a substantive environmental law could be built. And 
modern science has offered cascades of complexity and uncertainty in its 
place.  
At the beginning of the environmental movement, two related views of 
nature dominated. Nature was either an example of divine perfection or a 
perfect machine.148 Two conclusions might follow. First, undisturbed, or 
“pure,” nature should be walled off from human use to the maximum extent 
possible. Second, human activities such as pollution and resource exploita-
tion had disturbed nature’s balance, and the function of the law was to limit 
these activities and to restore the machine’s inherent balance.  
The fate of equilibrium ecology, the foundation of much early environ-
mental law, is telling. Lawyers understood ecology to teach that ecosystems 
                                                                                                                      
 145. Id. at 632–35 (O’Connor J., concurring). 
 146. Eric Freyfogle, a proponent of Leopoldian ethics and new, “greener” theories of 
property, has written: “Clearly, constructing a new environmental narrative will not be easy. 
The task is daunting, for a new narrative needs to promote land health and at the same time 
respect the individual . . . and allow for private rights in land.” ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, 
BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS 111 (1998). 
 147. LEOPOLD, supra note 34, at 207. 
 148. Charles J. Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and 
Some Criticisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 429–31 (1975). 
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evolved to a climax stage and then remained relatively stable over time.149 
The two patron saints of U.S. environmentalism, John Muir and Aldo 
Leopold, made the ethical or moral case for preservation and the restora-
tion of ecosystem balance. The more influential of the two, Aldo Leopold, 
took the principal lesson of ecology, the tendency of natural systems toward 
stasis, and turned it into an ethical imperative: let nature be.150  
Just as many of environmental law’s intellectual leaders taught that the 
law must take its substantive cues from the social and physical sciences, the 
stability hypothesis was being deconstructed within the discipline. Scien-
tists have now questioned all the notions of stability, from the very idea of 
an ecosystem to the definition of a species, and the dominant paradigm 
today is non-stationarity.151 Biologists have substituted non-equilibrium for 
equilibrium theories of ecosystems.152 As one ecological deconstructionist 
observed, “[t]he idea of risky nature is one that is hard for many people to 
swallow. Environmentalists recoil at the notion precisely because it seems 
to give man license to transform nature at will.”153 In short, we now are 
more sophisticated, but also more disillusioned.154 
                                                                                                                      
 149. ROBERT P. MCINTOSH, THE BACKGROUND OF ECOLOGY: CONCEPT AND 
THEORY (1985) and FRANK BENJAMIN GOLLEY, A HISTORY OF THE ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT 
IN ECOLOGY: MORE THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS (1993) trace the origins of modern 
ecology and the importance of stasis, or steady state ecosystems, which prevailed from the 
late nineteenth century to the beginning of the modern environmental movement.  
 150. LEOPOLD, supra note 34, at 224–25 (“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends other-
wise.”). 
 151. DANIEL BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES (2d ed. 2011). For a thoughtful 
analysis of the implications of non-equilibrium ecology for the protection of endangered 
species, see Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175 (2010). The non-stationarity paradigm postulates that natural 
systems are both dynamic and subject to a great range of disturbances from global climate 
change and human intervention. Thus models such as the hydrologic models used to predict 
flood risk and stream flow are no longer a valid basis for prediction and policy. The legal 
implications of non-stationarity are sketched in Robin Kundis Craig, ‘Stationarity is Dead’—
Long Live the Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010). 
 152. I have explored this paradigm shift in A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Para-
digm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 
(1994). 
 153. STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, NATURE’S KEEPERS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NATURE 
MANAGEMENT 98 (1995). 
 154. A leading environmental philosopher has tried to rescue “Saint” Aldo from the 
new ecology, but the result is not promising: 
The summary moral maxim of the land ethic, nevertheless, must be dynamized in 
light of developments in ecology since the mid-twentieth century. Although Leo-
pold acknowledged the existence and land-ethical significance of natural 
environmental change, he seems to have thought of it primarily on a very slow 
evolutionary temporal scale. But even so, he thereby incorporates the concept of 
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The acceptance of risk as a basis for regulation has encountered the 
same uncertainty problem, perhaps even more so. Much risk regulation is 
built on toxicity or cancer theory. As a leading student of the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act has written, “the information that science can provide 
is costly, time-consuming to obtain, and often of modest value given its 
large uncertainties.”155  
Undaunted by the dynamics of science, environmental ethicists have 
tried to build on Leopold to create a new set of science-derived environ-
mental ethics, but the effort has not been successful outside of academic 
discourse.156 The early preservation movement saw landscapes as awe-
inspiring natural areas,157 endowed with rights,158 which spiritually uplifted 
and sustained us with their physical beauty, compelling us to maintain their 
natural state. Environmental ethics, by contrast, sought to replace this soft 
spiritualism and deism with hard ethical imperatives. The ethics project can 
be seen as an early attempt, analogous to the precautionary principle, to 
transcend science: if the science did not support the outcome, the issue 
could be reframed as an ethical one.  
Efforts to construct a theory of non-anthropocentric ecosystem rights 
have been unable to overcome (1) the idea that rights are generally limited to 
sentient beings, and (2) the positivist prohibition against deriving value from 
fact.159 While philosophers continue to debate whether non-anthropocentric 
                                                                                                                      
inherent environmental change and the crucial norm of scale into the land ethic. 
In light of more recent developments in ecology, we can add norms of scale to the 
land ethic for both climatic and ecological dynamics in land-ethically evaluating 
anthropogenic changes in nature. One hesitates to edit Leopold’s elegant prose, 
but as a stab at formulating a dynamized summary moral maxim for the land eth-
ic, I hazard the following: “A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic 
community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.”  
J. Baird Callicott, Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold’s Land Ethic?, 
18 ENVTL. ETHICS 353, 372 (1996). 
 155. David E. Adelman, A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics Regulation, 
32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 377, 381 (2010). 
 156. See CHRISTOPHER STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL 
PLURALISM (1987) (critiquing non-anthropocentric ethics); but cf. Purdy, supra note 8 (argu-
ing that the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century views of nature that shaped the 
modern environmental movement are part of a continuing process of community self-
definition that will help us to cope with the challenge of global climate change). 
 157. National Park historians agree that the National Park system was created to 
preserve geological wonders, not large ecosystems, although later additions had more ration-
al ecological boundaries. See RICHARD WEST SELLERS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE 
NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY (1997). 
 158. See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1989). 
 159. See Richard A. Watson, A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism, 5 ENVTL. 
ETHICS 245 (1983) (providing an early, influential critique of non-anthropocentric ethics). 
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ethics are possible, economists and ecologists have progressed operationally 
by framing the question as a wholly anthropocentric one: What do ecosys-
tems do for us and how much are they worth?160 As a result of this market 
discourse,161 ethics have faded into the background as environmentalism has 
become a more rational movement, dominated by economics and ecology.162  
IV. IS THAT ALL? : TOWARD A SUBSTANTIVE,  
NON-POSITIVIST ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
In light of the failed efforts to develop a substantive, non-positivist  
environmental law, over the years Professor Sax and others have asked me: 
Is there nothing more to environmental law than strict procedural duties? 
Are there no substantive principles that impose real constraints on the 
processes that are widely seen as relatively substance neutral and thus permit 
important trade-offs? In response to Professor Sax and others, I suggest 
that, despite substantial limitations,163 it is possible to extract from our 
experience with positive environmental law a set of general principles that 
transcend their immediate legislative context. To this end, I offer interna-
tional environmental law as a possible source from which to derive such 
principles.  
This view may, of course, be dismissed by many as naive, unrealistic or 
just plain wrong. The arguments in favor of this bleak assessment include: 
(1) U.S. environmental law is the model for international environmental 
law. Thus, the parent has nothing to learn from the child. The United 
States tends to think of international environmental law simply as U.S. 
domestic law writ large. We gave the world the environmental impact 
assessment, the precautionary principle (along with the Germans), national 
                                                                                                                      
See generally PETER WENZ, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1988) (arguing that we can surmount 
this problem by adopting moral concern for the functioning of the entire ecological system); 
E.O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 351 (1992) (“[F]or what, in the final analysis, is 
morality but the command of conscience seasoned by a rational examination of the conse-
quences?”). The debate is fully covered in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (Paul Pojman & Louis 
P. Pojman eds., 2012). 
 160. This is the premise behind the valuation of ecosystem services. NATURE’S 
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON ECOSYSTEMS 23–70 (Gretchen C. Dailey ed., 1997). 
It is also the justification for markets created to charge beneficiaries for the cost of those 
services. James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997). 
 161. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a 
New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11 (2000) (lamenting the loss of dialogue including 
concepts of wonder and aesthetic enjoyment from environmental protection discourse). 
 162. Professor Christopher Schroeder has characterized the environmental movement 
as a struggle for dominance between prophets, priests and pragmatists. Christopher 
Schroeder, Prophets, Priests and Pragmatists, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1065 (2003). 
 163. See discussion supra Part II. 
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parks, the original nature reserves, and tradable emissions permits.164 (2) To 
a positivist, international environmental law is a set of vague and incoher-
ent principles and thus is marginal and soft law at best.165 It exists more in 
theory than in practice, primarily reflecting a set of lofty, aspirational 
norms. (3) International environmental law, like all international law, is 
based on the theory of consent to a norm or treaty. To negotiate a treaty 
that is likely to be ratified, the radically diverse interests of all nations must 
be accommodated. Diversity, driven by the North-South divide, is a persis-
tent feature of international environmental law. The compromise necessary 
to secure agreement among such diverse interests often leads to compro-
mising on the lowest common denominator.166 
All these arguments are powerful, but I posit that international envi-
ronmental law has at least two benefits as a source of substantive principles. 
First, international environmental law has taken a much more holistic view 
of the environment. True, there are media- and sector-specific treaties, but 
there has been a greater effort to link them together. International envi-
ronmental law has been synthesized into a set of norms that apply to almost 
all environmental problems. Many of the same norms can be found in U.S. 
environmental law, but international environmental law has transformed 
them into more general, overarching principles that can be applied to any 
environmental problem. International environmental law has also tried to 
move from negative prohibitions to affirmative environmental protection 
duties. And unlike U.S. environmental law, it has been considerably influ-
enced by academic commentary. The main academic contribution has been 
the synthesis of international environmental law, but visionary scholarship 
abounds.167  
Second, although environmental law can never completely move be-
yond process-based rules given the complex and dynamic nature of the 
subject, international environmental law has done a better job of linking 
                                                                                                                      
 164. Peter H. Sand, The Evolution of International Environmental Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29, 36–37 (Daniel Bodansky et al. 
eds., 2006) (noting how NEPA and pollution command and control were widely copied and 
became models for international environmental legal regimes). 
 165. This argument is summarized and applied in Roda Mushkat, Compliance with 
International Environmental Regimes: Chinese Lessons, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 493 (2010). 
 166. Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 259, 278 (1992) (providing the classic exposition of the lowest common denomina-
tor problem). 
 167. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989). Professor Weiss’s 
book is the classic example of visionary scholarship. She created the theory of justice toward 
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mental law. More generally, my old college debate partner has, more than anyone else, 
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procedure with substance to constrain decisions that adversely impact 
human and ecosystem “health.”168  
This is a crucial development because we need processes that go beyond 
the outcome-neutral and static end-state ones that the environmental impact 
assessment has produced. Put simply, we need processes that are structured 
to carry out the substantive objectives of an environmental protection man-
date. Environmental decision-making processes should have the following 
characteristics: (1) they should establish set baselines against which project-
ed levels of change can be evaluated;169 (2) they should contain a preference 
for ecosystem restoration and maintenance of system function or “health” 
over mitigation;170 (3) they should link the protection of human health, 
including risk exposure, to human dignity;171 (4) they should be dynamic 
and future oriented;172 and (5) they should have a mechanism to narrow the 
inevitable range of scientific uncertainty.173 In this spirit I offer three mixed 
substantive-procedural rules partially drawn from international law.  
A. Procedural Duties Must Be Linked to the Implementation  
of Substantive Outcomes  
Environmental law decisions do not seek to establish “truth,” but rather 
to promote the exercise of judgment informed primarily by scientific and 
                                                                                                                      
 168. Like everything else in environmental law, the validity of the construct of a 
“healthy” ecosystem is much contested. For a defense of this idea, see Katie McShane, 
Ecosystem Health, 26 ENVTL. ETHICS 227 (2004). 
 169. See A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Ecosys-
tem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1197–98 (2003). 
 170. In WILLIAM R. JORDAN III, THE SUNFLOWER FOREST: ECOLOGICAL 
RESTORATION AND THE NEW COMMUNION WITH NATURE (2003), Jordan argues that 
Leopold’s theory is incomplete because it ignores the negative aspects of nature (Is it right 
to withhold DDT from the developing world?), it fails to appreciate the relationship be-
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terms with the experience of consumption, and, more generally, ignores the original sin by 
imagining a return to an Edenic ideal. He concludes that a “philosophy or religion that 
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providing a means for dealing in a psychologically and spiritually productive way with the 
impacts that we do make simply won’t work.” Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted). 
 171. E.g., Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277 (1994). 
 172. Establishing the right amount of time into the future to consider is a hard issue. 
For an absurd time horizon, see Nuclear Energy Institute v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1270 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004). This case found that EPA erred in setting a ten thousand year compliance period 
for the Yucca Mountain high-level nuclear waste site because they were required to follow 
the advice of a National Academy of Sciences committee which found no basis for a ten 
thousand year limit! Id. 
 173. Cf. Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An Eco-
pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 201 
(2006). 
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economic information. Procedure should not be an end in and of itself.174 
And decision making must be more than an ad hoc, opened-ended stake-
holder process.175 Environmental problems often do not display a repetition 
of similar fact patterns, as many other areas of the law do. Decision making 
must be a rational process, constrained by a set of principles, which ensures 
that the decisions are responding to our understanding of what makes a 
problem “environmental.”  
U.S. environmental law started with this vision, but developed into a 
formal set of procedures divorced from substance. For example, one of the 
great tragedies of environmental law is the unfulfilled promise of NEPA.176 
As originally conceived, NEPA was to be a vehicle to inform Congress 
about the need to reorient federal policies,177 but it became a litigation tool 
to force better agency decisions, and the results are mixed at best.178  
The need to link procedure and substance is an expansion and correc-
tion of the more familiar first principle of environmental law based on 
NEPA: activities with potentially adverse environmental impacts—however 
defined—should be assessed before they are undertaken so that these im-
pacts can be minimized. Assessment was (and should be) a tool to make 
serious environmental degradation a last resort. But assessment has too 
often become an end in and of itself rather than a means to obtain the 
necessary information for informed decision making that advances envi-
ronmental values.179 NEPA currently only requires a one-time assessment 
of a project’s environmental impacts.180 Given the inevitable uncertainty  
in environmental decision making, any assessment duties must continue 
                                                                                                                      
 174. See Svitlana Kravchenko, Procedural Rights as a Crucial Tool to Combat Climate 
Change, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 613 (2010). 
 175. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. 
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 180. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE NEPA: HAVING 
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during all phases of an activity.181 For example, as discussed in the next 
proposed principle,182 monitoring and adaptive management would be 
required for activities that will last over a long period of time so that new, 
unanticipated threats may be effectively addressed.183  
The best illustration of the possible linkage between substance and 
procedure is the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision in Case 
Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay).184 Up-
stream Uruguay authorized a pulp paper mill on the River Uruguay, and 
downstream Argentina argued that the discharges would degrade the turgid 
river. On the merits, the Court agreed with Uruguay that the plant was 
using Best Available Technology and, inter alia, that the phosphorus load 
contributed by the plant is “insignificant in proportionate terms as com-
pared to the overall total phosphorus in the river from other sources.”185 
However, the Court found that Uruguay failed to fulfill a treaty obligation 
and customary legal duty to notify a bi-lateral treaty organization—an 
independent international body with legal personality—charged with man-
aging and protecting the river. This was not a bare, technical, procedural 
obligation, but a linked procedural and substantive one. Specifically, the 
Court rejected Argentina’s argument that a breach of a procedural obliga-
tion automatically entails the breach of a substantive obligation but agreed 
that there is a “functional link, in regard to prevention, between the two 
categories of obligations.”186 
Uruguay’s fundamental breach of the treaty and customary interna-
tional law was that it informed the river treaty body after completing and 
issuing the initial environmental authorization for the mill.187 The opinion 
stressed that notification sets in motion a response procedure, which ulti-
mately allows the notified party to object to the work and may trigger a 
duty to avoid damage.  
Although there was a procedural violation, the treaty did not prevent 
Uruguay from going ahead with construction, and dismantling the mill 
would not be an appropriate remedy for a procedural violation. However, 
the late, casual notice violated Uruguay’s duty to prevent damage.188 The 
late notice made it impossible for the organization to function as a forum 
                                                                                                                      
 181. This idea has been fully articulated by Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter 
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 182. See infra Part IV.B. 
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 185. Id. ¶ 247. 
 186. Id. ¶ 77–79. 
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for Argentina’s objections and to provide for the adoption of a range of 
mitigation measures and monitoring. As the Court explained, states have a 
duty not to knowingly allow their territory to be used in ways that damage 
the environment of another state.189 “[T]he obligation to inform [the treaty 
organization] . . . allows for the initiation of co-operation between Parties 
which is necessary to fulfill the obligation of prevention.”190 Further, 
Uruguay violated the duty to conduct good faith, meaningful negotiations. 
As a result of the ICJ’s decision, Argentina and Uruguay ended over a dec-
ade of trash talking among leading aquatic ecosystem specialists in the two 
countries and agreed to a joint monitoring program.191  
 
B. Incomplete Information Must Be a Basis for Regulation of Risk,  
Provided a Minimal Scientific Threshold of Risk is Established,  
Processes Are in Place to Acquire Additional Information, and  
the Decision Maker Has Authority to Adjust the Regulation to  
Changed Circumstances 
This cumbersome principle is an effort to develop a “rational,” adaptive 
precautionary principle that addresses the main United States objections to 
the precautionary principle.192 The four most common versions of the  
precautionary principle are: 
1. Non-Preclusion: regulation is not precluded by scientific uncer-
tainty about the nature of a harm. 
2. Margin of Safety: activities should be limited to a level below 
that at which adverse effects occur.  
3. Best Available Technology (BAT): BAT should be applied in 
cases of uncertainty rather than risk standards. 
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4. Prohibitory Precaution: proponents of an activity or product have 
the burden of showing that, despite uncertainty, the activity 
poses no appreciable risk of harm.  
The first iteration is the most common. It tracks authoritative statements, 
such as Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration193 and statements in the 
European Union Treaty of Lisbon,194 that are regarded as significant recog-
nitions that the precautionary principle is now customary international 
law.195 All formulations of the precautionary principle attempt to balance 
between (1) the due process-based, common law background rule that 
mechanistic proof that an activity will cause demonstrable harm is a univer-
sal predicate for health and ecosystem protection, and (2) the ability to 
regulate in the absence of this proof. It is hardly a novel concept. It is well 
established in U.S. environmental law that a high degree of certainty about 
the adverse impacts of a substance or activity is not necessary to regulate.196 
The Constitution does not require mechanistic proof of cause-in-fact 
because a lesser standard of proof is appropriate for public health-based 
regulation. Risk-based liability can be justified as a form of tax imposed on 
those who directly profit from harmful activities, and which is fairly spread 
over larger segments of the population.197 
Once environmental decisions are characterized as informed judgments 
under conditions of uncertainty, and risk is accepted as a basis for regula-
tion, many anti-precautionary principle arguments lose their force. 
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Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (“Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”).  
 194. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 191, May 9, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.  
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(2d ed. 2003). 
 196. The legal literature is immense. E.g., John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precau-
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However, the precautionary principle remains too open ended and subject 
to abuse and demonization. For example, John D. Graham, an official at the 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget during the George W. Bush 
administration, stated that in the United States “[w]e consider [the precau-
tionary principle] to be a mythical concept, perhaps like a unicorn.”198 
Current articulations of precaution must be bounded by science and 
economic rationality. My formulation thus rejects the argument (sometimes 
asserted by the European Union in World Trade Organization disputes) 
that there can be cultural, in addition to scientific, bases for invoking the 
principle.199 It rejects invoking the precautionary principle to substitute 
naked fear, or distaste for a production activity, for some attempt to assess 
the probability and magnitude of the risk. There must, as the European 
Court of Justice has held, be a significant risk threshold before the principle 
can be invoked.200 My formulation also rejects the argument, invoked by the 
United States in trade disputes, that the WTO Agreement on the Applica-
tion of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures limits a country’s right to set 
special controls on food products to those demonstrably “based on scientific 
principles” (i.e., that a product such as a genetically modified organism 
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WK14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/18/weekinreview/precaution-is-for-
europeans.html. The leading academic critique of the principle is CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF 
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005). 
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tomary law in the GMO WTO Panel report. Panel Report, European Community—Measures 
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Biosafety, Jan. 29, 2000, 31 I.L.M. 1257, recognized the principle in Article 1, but the WTO 
Panel ruled that it need not adopt the principle because not all countries had adopted the 
Protocol.  
 200. Case C-333/08, Comm’n v. France, 2010 EUR Lex 62008CJ0333 (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0333:EN:HTML; 
see also CASS SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2007). Sunstein combines the idea of a 
threshold for catastrophic risk with cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 167–68. I do not accept this 
proposed threshold limitation, but agree with the idea of bounds and his use of precaution 
to avoid irreversible harm. Id. at 177. 
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must be scientifically shown to be harmful before it may be restricted).201 
My formulation rejects the dichotomies between precaution and risk and 
assessment and management. 
The crucial issues for any version of precaution are the burden of proof 
and adaptability. Proponents of the precautionary principle have argued 
that opponents of regulation should bear the burden of rebutting the exer-
cise of the principle.202 However, given the risk that the precautionary 
principle could choke off a wide range of considerations, such as risk trade-
offs, it seems more sensible to place the initial burden of justification on 
the government body that invokes it. This would ensure that alternative 
methods of minimizing the risk of injury, such as compensation, have been 
adequately explored and that the principle is reserved for the most serious 
and largely irreversible risks.  
In addition, the idea that a decision to use the precautionary principle 
is permanent should be excised. The precautionary principle needs to be 
linked to the idea of adaptive management.203 The existence of monitoring 
and adaptive feedback mechanisms should be a major factor in validating 
the decision to limit an activity when the adverse impacts are uncertain.204  
The central objective of environmental decision making is to reduce 
inevitable uncertainty through the constant generation and application of 
new knowledge. This view builds on an idea advanced by Judge Hans Linde 
of the Oregon Supreme Court that courts should impose a right to due 
process of law making,205 and on elements of the newer theory of reflexive 
environmental law.206 Both these theories, in my opinion, stress the need 
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for processes that address social problems rationally and provide procedures 
for the periodic review of regulations in light of new knowledge. Envi-
ronmental decisions should be made through science-based processes that 
use the various candidate principles of law that have emerged in the past 
four decades as rebuttable presumptions, rather than as hard decision rules. 
Because environmental law and policy are fundamentally science-based, 
they are inherently dynamic. It has been just over forty years since govern-
ments began to focus on the threats that unrestrained resource use pose to 
the conditions necessary for human welfare. We are at the early stages of 
learning how to manage our use of the planet’s natural functions and 
services; thus it is impossible to adopt fixed rules. 
The current instrument of choice for keeping up with the dynamism 
of scientific knowledge is adaptive management. Adaptive management 
was developed in the late 1970s as a critique of static or deterministic 
environmental assessment. The basic argument was that “a fixed review of 
an independently designed policy” was inconsistent with the experience of 
resource managers worldwide and with what has come to be called non-
equilibrium ecology.207  
In short, dynamism and a constrained precautionary principle must be 
introduced into decision making.208 The most serious defect in existing 
decision processes is the absence of a feedback loop to trigger re-evaluation 
of an initial decision. The need for rigorous, but flexible, procedures to 
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty has a long intellectual pedi-
gree, including decision theory.209 Many resource decisions always had an 
experimental component and included monitoring procedures, but few 
contained mechanisms to adapt regimes to new information and system 
changes. Adaptive management acknowledges the need to act in the face of 
scientific uncertainty, while also realizing that the uncertainty must be 
narrowed over time and that management decisions can no longer be pre-
sumed to be final. Management institutions must have the capacity to 
modify earlier actions as new information about environmental and other 
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impacts is collected and understood. Regulation and resource management 
should increase or decrease as we learn from experience.210 
C. Decisions Should Exhibit Planetary Stewardship by: (1) Applying the 
Best Available Technology, (2) Applying the Polluter Pays Principle,  
(3) Promoting an Accepted Standard of Sustainable Development,  
(4) Adopting the Least Intrusive Resource Use Option with Adaptive  
Feedback, and (5) Restoring Degraded Ecosystems  
This principle is an extension of the foundational principle of interna-
tional law that no state shall allow its territory to be used in a way that 
harms another state.211 It extends this negative duty to the affirmative duty 
of stewardship.  
Stewardship is a widely-invoked principle.212 There is an emerging 
global consensus that we must replace the Greco-Judeo-Christian concep-
tion of Man as despot over nature213 with the principle that we are stewards 
of the earth.214 Gilbert White has written: 
People around the world in the 1990s are perceiving the earth as 
more than a globe to be surveyed, or developed for the public good 
in the short term, or to be protected from threats to its well-being 
both human and natural. It is all of these to some degree, but has 
additional dimensions. People in many cultures accept its scientific 
description as a matter of belief. They recognize a commitment to 
care for it in perpetuity. They accept reluctantly the obligation to 
come to terms with problems posed by growth in numbers and 
appetites. This is not simply an analysis of economic and social 
consequences of political policies toward environmental matters. 
The roots are a growing solemn sense of the individual as part of 
one human family for whom the earth is its spiritual home.215 
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The problem is in the principle’s application. As with all overarching prin-
ciples, it is difficult to translate into enforceable judicial standards.  
The experience with sustainable development is instructive. Sustainable 
development is an important component of stewardship, encompassing the 
three potentially inconsistent standards of economic growth, environmental 
stewardship, and social justice. Lawyers have tried to apply this widely 
accepted norm,216 but so far they have been stymied by its incoherence.217 
An influential concurring opinion in an ICJ case embraced sustainable 
development as an international norm,218 but U.S. courts have not done the 
same. For example, a federal district court refused to hold that the  
discharge of mining wastes in Papua New Guinea violated the international 
duty to practice sustainable development. The claim was not actionable 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act219 because the sustainable development 
principle lacked the requisite definition and obligatory nature, and viola-
tions of the principle lacked the three essential requirements of the Act: a 
universal definition, a recognition by states that the duty to follow the 
principle is obligatory, and state condemnations of violations.220 In domestic 
litigation, courts have occasionally upheld land use sustainability initiatives, 
although usually on more traditional grounds.221 Rather than trying to 
develop a unitary definition of sustainable development, it might be better 
to let it emerge incrementally as an element of the broader principle of 
stewardship.  
Because the concept of stewardship is contested, not well-articulated, 
and evolving, I opt for an analogy to LEED-certified buildings. There is no 
single formula for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) certification; rather the developer can choose among a variety of 
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performance standards.222 Similarly, all of the elements of my proposed 
principle are necessary to implement the core idea of respect and caring for 
our natural world.  
For example, the “polluter pays” principle is powerful and widely  
accepted because it both attempts to prevent pollution and to ensure that 
victims of pollution are compensated.223 The principle works best when 
there is a clear causal relationship between an emitter and damage, and 
where the emitter can pass the costs of prevention on to consumers of its 
product. However, as the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill illustrates, existing legal 
regimes often fall short of both preventing pollution and fully compensat-
ing the human victims, as well as addressing the ecosystem losses, from a 
serious contamination episode.224 As we move to address global climate 
change, it is harder to apply the “polluter pays” principle to individual 
consumer and lifestyle choices.225 For this reason, other legal strategies, 
such as the restoration of degraded ecosystems and the least intrusive dis-
ruption principle, backstopped by adaptive management, must complement 
“polluter pays.”  
Restoration is a component of “polluter pays,”226 but the idea extends 
to the restoration of ecosystems where no polluter can be identified or is 
capable of financing the restoration. Least intrusive disruption227 and 
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adaptive management also fill in gaps left by the limits of the “polluter 
pays” principle.  
We cannot return to the Garden of Eden, but we can perhaps approxi-
mate it. A major 1992 report by a National Academy of Sciences 
Committee, Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems,228 defines restoration as “the 
return of an ecosystem to a close approximation of its condition prior to 
disturbance.”229 This definition distinguishes restoration from other im-
provements, such as creation, reclamation, and rehabilitation because only 
restoration is a holistic process rather than an “isolated manipulation of 
individual elements.”230 The report also distinguishes restoration from 
mitigation, which it dismisses as “simply the alleviating of any or all detri-
mental effects arising from a given action,” as well as from preservation.231  
Stewardship is supported by multiple sources.232 It is grounded in the 
principle of intergenerational equity articulated by Professor Edith Brown 
Weiss.233 Her standard permits resource exploitation subject to the con-
straint that we leave renewable resources in no worse shape than we found 
them, or at least preserve a wide range of use options for future genera-
tions. As a leading environmental philosopher has noted, “environmentalists 
will achieve more by appealing to the relatively noncontroversial and intui-
tive idea that the use of natural resources implies an obligation to protect 
them for future users—a sustainability theory based on intergenerational 
equity—rather than exotic appeals to hereto unnoticed inherent values in 
nature.”234 One of the leading examples of the application of this principle 
remains the Tasmanian Dam Case.235 The Australian High Court accepted a 
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World Heritage Convention236 listing of a rainforest in Tasmania as a re-
straint on a federal state’s internal power to build a dam. The High Court’s 
use of the Convention to allow Australia’s constitutionally weak federal 
government to override a state resource use choice is an explicit recognition 
that the mission of the Convention is to list “natural and cultural sites 
whose irreplaceable value should be preserved for future generations.”237 
Stewardship is also supported by economic considerations. The eco-
nomic dimension emphasizes two strands of neo-welfare economics. The 
first and more familiar strand adopts the concern for more accurate 
measures of efficiency.238 The environmental movement brought the mar-
ginal economic concept of external costs to the fore. Too many products 
and activities are underpriced because their price does not reflect the full or 
social cost of the product or activity, either because regulations do not force 
the internalization of all externalities or because there is a partial subsidy.239 
The second strand is the concept of foregone opportunity costs. These 
are the foregone revenues (or other benefits) from alternative uses of the 
resource. Economists traditionally have taught that it is rational to prefer 
present consumption to deferred consumption.240 Future benefits have been 
discounted and the opportunity costs, the future value of foregone resource 
development and use, have been ignored.241 Efforts to calculate these costs 
force private and public actors to consider the longer-range economic con-
sequences of decisions and a broader mix of alternative activities. The  
removal of old dams is just one example of greater attention to opportunity 
costs. The United States is starting to remove small and medium-sized 
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dams that yield smaller hydroelectricity benefits compared to the economic 
value of a free-flowing river.242  
CONCLUSION 
Principles alone cannot implement an idea as radical and complex as 
environmental protection. Nor can they can they prevent republican govern-
ments from oscillating between protection and marginalization. What a set 
of substantive principles can do is to shift the burden of justification for 
actions that increase public health risks or threaten to reduce the resiliency 
of natural systems from those who oppose them to those who promote 
them in the name of necessary trade-offs.  
The line between procedure and substance is always a hazy one. But, 
the proposed principles are on the substantive side of the line because they 
are not neutral. There is no ultimate truth in environmental protection. 
There are only assumptions, and biases, about the consequences of not acting 
to prevent degradation. These principles incorporate these assumptions but 
do not adopt them as absolutes. In short, the principles that I propose are 
primarily science-based and thus are designed to make it harder for those 
who wish to marginalize environmental protection to ignore the lessons of 
science, however ambiguous they may be.243  
I do not want to return to the state of the law prior to 1969. Environ-
mental interests were either never considered by public and private actors 
or, at most, were given minimal attention and then pushed aside. The 
processes adopted in an attempt to reverse this state of affairs were never 
intended to be ends in themselves. Procedures such as environmental 
impact assessments were always meant to produce decisions that advance 
the goals of environmentalism, rather than being mere boxes to be checked 
before decisions are made that compromise public health and ecosystem 
resilience and contain no feedback mechanisms for evaluating the decisions 
over time. The principles I propose can both cement the procedural legacy 
of environmental law by returning it to its early roots and carry it forward 
by emphasizing the link between procedure and substance, moving us 
closer to a substantive, non-positivist U.S. environmental law. 
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